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An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The primary goal of this article is to bring empirical evidence to bear on the largely 
theoretical law and economics debate about insider trading.  The article first summarizes 
various agency cost and market theories of insider trading propounded over the course of 
this perennial debate.  The article then proposes three testable hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between insider trading laws and several measures of stock market 
performance.  Using international data, the paper finds that more stringent insider trading 
laws are generally associated with more dispersed equity ownership, greater stock price 
accuracy and greater stock market liquidity. These results suggest the appropriate locus 
of academic and policy inquiries about the efficiency implications of insider trading.   
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 Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World 
An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate  
 
 
Introduction 
The law and economics debate about the desirability of prohibiting insider trading 
– trading by corporate insiders on material, non-public information – is both long-
standing and unresolved.  The early legal debate centered on whether insider trading is 
unfair to public investors who are not privy to private corporate information.1  However, 
the fairness inquiry was malleable, lacked a rigorous theoretical framework, and therefore 
did not yield coherent or practical policy prescriptions.2  Professor Henry Manne abruptly 
shifted the debate to an efficiency inquiry with his now classic 1966 book, Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market.  In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Manne argued 
that, contrary to the prevailing legal and moral opinion of the time, insider trading is 
desirable because it is economically efficient.  Manne’s controversial thesis abruptly 
shifted the focus from fairness to the economics of insider trading and precipitated an 
intense debate in the law and economics literature about the efficiency implications of 
insider trading.3  The central question in the law and economics debate is whether insider 
trading is economically inefficient and thus ought to be subject to government regulation 
or, conversely, whether it is economically efficient and thus ought not to be regulated.  
Law and economics scholars sit on both sides of the fence.4  Some even straddle the 
fence, for example, by arguing that even if insider trading might be inefficient (bad) for 
some firms it might be efficient (good) for other firms and therefore the law should 
enable corporations and shareholders to address insider trading via private contract, on a 
case by case basis.  Without question, the law and economics approach has advanced the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market, 53 Virginia Law Review, 1425 (1967).  See also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and 
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 334 (1979) (“the 
antifraud provisions [of U.S. securities laws] are said to serve principally a protective function –  to prevent 
overreaching of public investors – and only peripherally an efficiency goal”). 
2  U.S. insider trading law doctrine demonstrates this confusion and ambiguity.  See generally 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 772 (Vol. III, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition:  A Legal and 
Economic Enigma, 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 35 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 309-339. 
3   HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
4   Is a citation necessary here? 
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 legal policy debate about insider trading, but it has not achieved consensus on 
fundamental questions.   
The law and economics literature on insider trading is plagued by a few 
significant shortcomings.  Like the fairness inquiry, the efficiency inquiry is rather 
elusive, as no single locus of efficiency focuses the scholarly debate.  Rather, the 
investigations vary from an examinations of the narrow effects of insider trading on 
efficiency at the firm level (agency theories of insider trading)5 to work studying the 
broader effects of insider trading on stock market efficiency (market theories of insider 
trading).6  It is possible, for example, that insider trading may enhance efficiency within 
the firm, but that markets in which insider trading is permitted are thereby less efficient in 
the aggregate.  Researchers who focus their studies at different levels and report different 
results could be talking past each other.  A second, major deficiency of the law and 
economics literature on insider trading is that it is insufficiently grounded in empirical 
evidence, although, as Professors Carlton and Fischel note, the “desirability of 
[regulating] insider trading is ultimately an empirical question.”7  Rather, beginning with 
Manne’s seminal argument, law and economics scholarship on insider trading has been 
largely speculative and theoretical.  Finally, also until recently, the existing empirical 
literature on insider trading has been American-centered.  Few scholars have sought to 
examine the impact of insider trading rules in a comparative context.  This is important 
because without variation in insider trading rules, one cannot test causal hypotheses. 
This article, unlike most of the existing legal scholarship on insider trading, is 
empirical and comparative.8  The main aim is to determine whether insider trading laws 
                                                 
5   Is a citation necessary here? 
6   See Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 297, 299 (1994). 
7   Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 
866 (1983). 
8   The article contributes to the large and ever-expanding empirical law and finance literature.  See, 
e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants 
of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]; Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 127 (1999); John 
Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its 
Implications, 93 Northwestern University Law Review 641 (1999) [hereinafter Prospects for Global 
Convergence]; John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Rise of Dispersed Ownership]; 
 
 
5
5
Beny:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
 are systematically related to stock market performance across countries.  To that end, the 
article formulates three testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between insider 
trading laws and equity ownership, the informativeness of stock prices, and stock market 
liquidity, respectively.  These hypotheses are that countries with more stringent insider 
trading laws will have (a) more widespread equity ownership; (b) more informative stock 
prices; and (c) more liquid stock markets, other things equal.  To test these hypotheses, I 
constructed a unique index of the stringency of insider trading laws for 33 countries as of 
the mid-1990s.  Using multivariable regression analysis,9 I find that countries with more 
stringent insider trading laws have more dispersed equity ownership; more liquid stock 
markets; and more informative stock prices, consistent with the formulated hypotheses.  
Because of the small number of available cases and the impossibility of controlling for all 
potentially relevant variables, these conclusions must be regarded as tentative, but they 
are nonetheless significant.  If insider trading laws are detrimental, as Professor Manne 
and others have posited, the pattern I find would have been unlikely. 
The article is organized as follows.  Part I reviews the theoretical law and 
economics debate about the desirability of regulating insider trading, categorizing the 
theories of insider trading into two broad groups, agency theories and market theories.  
Part II formulates three testable hypotheses that emerge from the theoretical literature.  
Part III describes the data and presents summary statistics.  Part IV presents and discusses 
the results of multivariable regression analysis.  Finally, Part V concludes by addressing 
some of the implications of this article’s findings for the theoretical law and economics 
debate about insider trading.   
I. The Law and Economics Debate over Insider Trading 
Law and economics theories about insider trading fall into two main categories: 
agency theories and market theories of insider trading.10  Agency theories of insider 
trading analyze its effect on the classic corporate agency problem, the manager-
                                                                                                                                                 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 
Journal of Finance 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., What Works?]; Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (2006) 
[hereinafter Djankov et al., Self-Dealing] (unpublished working paper, on file with the author). 
9   See discussion infra at Part IV. 
10   Proponents and opponents of insider trading regulation often defend their arguments on both 
agency and market efficiency grounds.  However, this categorization of the arguments is a useful 
organizing tool. 
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 shareholder conflict of interest.11  These theories consider whether insider trading 
ameliorates or worsens this conflict, and therefore whether it increases or reduces firm-
level efficiency.12  In contrast, market theories of insider trading address its broader 
ramifications for market efficiency.13  In this Part, I summarize common agency and 
market theories for and against insider trading regulation, and I briefly discuss the private 
contracting approach that some opponents of insider trading regulation advocate. 
A. Agency Theories of Insider Trading 
Agency theories of insider trading analyze the effects of insider trading on agency 
costs.14  If insider trading reduces the divergence between shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests, then it reduces agency costs.  Conversely, if insider trading increases this 
divergence, it increases agency costs.  Proponents of unregulated insider trading argue 
that the former is true, while proponents of insider trading regulation opt for the latter. 
1. Insider Trading as an Efficient Compensation Mechanism 
In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Professor Manne argues that insider 
trading is economically efficient because it motivates entrepreneurial innovation.15  
According to Manne, it is difficult to compensate entrepreneurs because, unlike 
capitalists and salaried employees, it is hard to identify entrepreneurs in advance.  
Because anyone from regular salaried employees to top executives may generate 
                                                 
11  See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (2005); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976). 
12   Judge Easterbrook was one of the first scholars systematically to explore the agency dimensions of 
insider trading.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS: 
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Harvard Business School 
Press, 81-100, 1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem]. 
13  These market features are often referred to collectively as market integrity.  See generally, 
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80 American Economic 
Review 1022 (modeling the effect of insider trading on “investor confidence”); Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem 
Daouk, Brian Jorgenson & Carl-Heinrich Kehr, When an Event is Not an Event: The Curious Case of an 
Emerging Market, 55 Journal of Financial Economics 69, 72 (2000) (“Market integrity refers to the 
disadvantages that outsiders face vis-à-vis insiders when trading in the market”).  
14   Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as the sum of the shareholders’ monitoring costs, the 
managers’ bonding costs, if any, and the residual loss, which is the decrease in shareholders’ welfare 
caused by the divergence between the managers’ decisions and the decisions that would maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth.  Michael Jensen and W. Meckling, supra note [ ], at 308.   Judge Easterbrook was 
one of the first scholars systematically to explore the agency dimensions of insider trading.  See 
Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, supra note [ ]. 
15   HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
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 profitable innovations, it is difficult to set entrepreneurs’ pay in advance.  Moreover, the 
value of entrepreneurial activity will be vague at the outset:   
True innovation cannot be predicted nor its value known before it has been 
thought of and made effective.  True innovation cannot be planned and 
budgeted in advance.  An individual cannot be hired to perform x amount 
of entrepreneurial service.16  
Finally, so the argument goes, the dynamic nature of innovation renders it virtually 
impossible to contract over in advance.17
Insider trading is seen as a mechanism to avoid the inefficiencies that these 
conditions would otherwise produce.  Through insider trading, entrepreneurs can be 
rewarded in direct proportion to and contemporaneously with their innovations.18  
Entrepreneurial innovation creates valuable new information (at the most basic level, that 
there has been an innovation) and the first person to know about it is the entrepreneur 
who produced the innovation.  She can profit by buying the company’s shares before the 
public learns of the innovation and before their value rises to reflect the positive news.  
Even if the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and thus cannot buy unlimited shares, she 
can “sell” this information to others.19  In this manner, insider trading “readily allows 
corporate entrepreneurs to market their innovations,” thus forging a closer link between 
entrepreneurial compensation and innovation.20  Since it maximizes their incentives to 
innovate, insider trading is the best way to compensate entrepreneurs.21
Professors Carlton and Fischel recast Manne’s efficient compensation thesis in the 
language of the economics of agency.22  They argue that insider trading is efficient 
because it reduces agency costs.  In their view, relying on capital and product markets to 
properly incentivize managers is insufficient because these markets work imperfectly, 
making it relatively difficult to remove poorly performing managers.  Ex ante 
compensation contracts are inadequate because they would require costly “periodic 
                                                 
16   Manne, supra note [ ], at 133. 
17   Manne, supra note [ ], at 132-138. 
18   Manne, supra note [ ], at 138-141. 
19  Manne, supra note [ ], at 138-139. 
20   Manne, supra note [ ], at 138. 
21   Id. 
22   Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 866. 
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 renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effort and output.”23  In contrast, 
insider trading enables managers continually to update their compensation in light of new 
information without incurring renegotiation costs.24  Insider trading thus increases 
mangers’ incentives by linking their “fortunes more closely to those of the firm.”25   
In addition, Professors Carlton and Fischel claim, insider trading improves the 
managerial labor market: 
A related advantage of insider trading is that it provides firms with 
valuable information concerning prospective managers.  It is difficult for 
firms to identify those prospective managers who will work hard and not 
be overly risk averse in their choice of investment projects.  Basing 
compensation in part on insider trading is one method for sorting superior 
from inferior managers.  Because insider trading rewards those managers 
who create valuable information and are willing to take risks, managers 
who most prefer such compensation schemes may be those who are the 
least risk averse and the most capable.26
Because the ability to engage in insider trading causes the most able managers to self-
select into firms that allow it, insider trading reduces both screening and monitoring 
costs.27  Lower screening and monitoring costs imply lower agency costs, a central 
concern of corporate law. 
2. Insider Trading as an Agency Cost 
Proponents of insider trading regulation emphasize its rent-extraction potential, 
suggesting that insider trading might simply be an inefficient private benefit of control 
that accrues to managers and other insiders at shareholders’ expense.28  They argue that 
rather than serving as an incentive-alignment device that more closely aligns 
shareholders’ and manager’s interests, insider trading can exacerbate agency costs by 
                                                 
23   Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 869. 
24   Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 866. 
25   Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 877. 
26   Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 871-872. 
27  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 866. 
28   On the problem of private benefits of control, see generally, Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. 
Hart, Coporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND 
UNCERTAINTY 125 (J.J. McCall, ed., University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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 distorting the managerial wage-setting process.29  If they are permitted to trade, managers 
might be able ex post to undo an efficient ex ante compensation contract and thereby 
sabotage performance-based compensation schemes intended to calibrate pay to 
productivity.30  As a result, firms might have to monitor managers’ trading ex post, 
offsetting its presumed cost saving to the firm.31   
In addition, some proponents regulation argue that in practice it is difficult to 
ensure that those who produce valuable information (i.e., entrepreneurial innovations) are 
the only ones who are able to profit from it.32  This non-excludability feature of insider 
trading benefits could generate a free-rider problem and possibly lead to information 
hoarding within the firm as the true entrepreneurs, who are the real innovators in the firm, 
would have an incentive to hold their information close to their chests in order to 
maintain a monopoly on insider trading profits.  The inability of the firm’s true 
entrepreneurs to monopolize the information about their innovations vis-à-vis other 
insiders might ultimately reduce the incentive to innovate and therefore negatively affect 
corporate performance.  In addition, by obstructing the free flow of information through 
the firm, such information hoarding could reduce the firm’s overall organizational 
efficiency.33   
                                                 
29   Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in 
EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING, 47, 52 (K. Hopt & E. Wymeersch, eds. 1991); Klock, supra note [ ], at 313-
315. 
30   Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 52. 
31   Even Professors Carlton and Fischel, ardent proponents of deregulation, concede that “[b]anning 
insider trading would prevent insiders from undoing compensation agreements in this manner.”  Carlton & 
Fischel, supra note [ ], at 873. 
32   See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago 
School, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 653 (1986) (“most [U.S.] insider-trading cases have not involved those whose 
entrepreneurial or other managerial efforts have produced the value-increasing event that was traded upon.  
Instead, the defendants have been outside directors, professionals, or clerks whose assistance was used to 
complete the transaction, not to create it”).  
33  Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large 
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1053-1067 (1982).  This argument is, in my view, an example of the 
shortcomings of the abstract theorizing that has characterized both sides of the insider trading debate.  If an 
innovator held her information completely private, neither she nor her firm would benefit because the 
innovation would never be developed.  If she were to buy stock in the company before disclosing her idea, 
her investment would have to account for the likelihood that she could not sell her innovation within the 
firm and she might be poorly situated to estimate this risk. Realistically, the type of insider trading that 
regulators have been concerned with often do not involve innovation at all but knowledge that a person 
secures because of her position in the firm, such as knowledge about what the next quarterly report will 
say.  To the extent that innovation is involved, trading on the inside knowledge is likely to be sufficiently 
downstream from the original innovative or entrepreneurial spark that many who did not contribute to its 
development will be able to benefit from it if they are allowed to trade on their inside knowledge.   
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 Proponents of insider trading legislation also claim that allowing managers to 
trade on inside information might give them incentives to take on too much risk or to 
undertake value-reducing projects.34  Since insider trading is more profitable the more 
volatile are stock prices, it might encourage managers to engage in excessively risky 
investment behavior by undertaking overly risky projects that create private opportunities 
for profitable insider trading but that reduce corporate value for the firm.35  In addition, 
since managers can profit from insider trading whether the firm is performing poorly or 
well, insider trading increases managers’ incentives to under-perform by making them 
indifferent between whether the firm is doing well or poorly.36   
  If corporate insiders are permitted to sell the firm’s shares short, the potential 
problems of excessive risk-taking and compensation unbundling induced by insider 
trading may be exacerbated.37  Professor Klock gives a colorful and somewhat humorous 
example: 
A case in point is that of Mr. Albert Wiggin, as told by Professor Malkiel.  
Mr Wiggin was,  
[t]he head of Chase, the nation’s second largest bank at the 
time.  In July 1929 Mr. Wiggin became apprehensive about 
the dizzy heights to which stocks had climbed and no 
longer felt comfortable speculating on the bull side of the 
market….Believing that the prospects of his own bank’s 
stock were particularly dim…he sold short over 42,000 
shares of Chase stock…. 
                                                 
34 See Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 52; Klock, supra note [ ], at 313-315.  See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Chaim Fershtman, Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice Among Risky Projects, 29 Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1 (1994) (presenting a formal economic model of the effect of insider 
trading on managers’ choice among risky investments).   
35   See Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 52 (“The option-like character of returns from insider trading 
rewards the selection of projects with volatile payouts, regardless of whether they have a positive or 
negative return on net”).  In response, opponents of insider trading regulation claim that managers are too 
risk averse and insider trading encourages them to bear more risk, which is good for shareholders. 
36 Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 52; Klock, supra note [ ], at 313-315; Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an 
Agency Problem, supra note [ ], at 86; Iman Anabtawi, Note: Toward A Definition of Insider Trading, 41 
Stanford Law Review 377, 391-392 (1989). 
37  In the U.S., Rule 16(b) prohibits short-selling.  U.S. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b). 
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  Wiggin’s timing was perfect.  Immediately after the 
short sale the price of Chase stock began to fall, and when 
the crash came in the fall the stock dropped precipitously.  
When the account was closed in November, Mr. Wiggin 
had netted a multimillion dollar profit from the 
operation…. 
There are two possible interpretations of the Wiggin case.  One is that Mr. 
Wiggin believed bad news was inevitable and sold short.  He then worked 
vigorously against his own self interest trying to minimize his profit, and 
even trying to lose his personal wealth, but nevertheless managed to make 
a great deal of money in spite of his best efforts to the contrary….The 
alternative is that there is some self-dealing going on.  Readers are left to 
determine for themselves the more probable explanation.38
B. Market Theories of Insider Trading  
Insider trading might have efficiency implications that are broader than its effects 
at the firm level.39  Market theories of insider trading address these broader ramifications.  
The two measures that are most frequently addressed in the insider trading debate are 
stock price accuracy and stock market liquidity.  Economists and finance scholars have 
long noted the importance of both of these characteristics of the stock market to the 
efficiency of capital allocation and the cost of capital and therefore ultimately to 
economic growth.40
                                                 
38  Klock, supra note [ ], at 314-315 (quoting BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL 
STREET 186 (1990). 
39  See generally Zohar Goshen & Giedeon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and 
“Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001) (discussing the effects of insider 
trading on market efficiency); Kimberly Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: 
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Northwestern University Law Review 
443 (2001) (addressing the efficiency implications of insider trading for the market for information). 
40  On the positive role of share price accuracy, see Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, & 
Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 331, 345-346; Li Jin & Stewart C. Myers, R2 Around the World:  New Theory and New Tests, 79 
Journal of Financial Economics, 257 (2006); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of 
Capital, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 187 (2000).  On the positive role of stock market liquidity, see 
Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 Journal of Financial 
Economics 223 (1986); Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Payout Policy: Cash 
Dividends versus Open Market Repurchases, 22 Journal of Financial Economics 61 (1988); Gady Jacoby, 
David J. Fowler, & Aron A. Gotesman, The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Liquidity Effect: A 
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 1. Insider Trading and Stock Price Accuracy 
a. The Meaning and Economic Significance of Stock Price Accuracy 
There is disagreement about the meaning of accurate stock prices.41  In this 
article, I refer to accurate stock prices as stock prices that reflect as much firm-specific 
information as possible.  As Professors Fox, Morck, Yeung, and Durnev point out, 
“[s]hare price is relatively ‘accurate’ if it is likely to be relatively close, whether above or 
below, to the share’s actual value.  When a price has a high expected accuracy, the 
deviation of the price from actual value is, on average, relatively small.”42    
Accurate share prices are important to economic efficiency via their effect on 
capital allocation:   
More accurate prices can increase the amount of value added by firms as 
they use society’s scarce resources for the production of goods and 
services.  In a competitive economy, the increase in value added will 
generally increase both the level of firm cash flows and returns to other 
factors of production….by improving the quality of [capital allocation 
across] investment projects in the economy and by improving the 
operation of existing real assets.43
In addition to improving the efficiency of capital allocation, accurate stock prices 
might reduce agency costs within the firm:   
[A]dditional disclosure and increased share price accuracy by signaling 
when there are problems, assist in both the effective exercise of the 
shareholder franchise and shareholder enforcement of management’s 
fiduciary duties.  Additional disclosure and more accurate share prices 
also increase the threat of hostile takeover when managers engage in non-
                                                                                                                                                 
Theoretical Approach, 3 Journal of Financial Markets 69 (2000): John M. R. Chalmers & Gregory B. 
Kadlec, An Empirical Examination of the Amortized Spread, 48 Journal of Financial Economics 159 
(1998); Vinay T. Datar, Narayan Y. Naik, & Robert Radcliffe, Liquidity and Stock Returns: An Alternative 
Test, 1 Journal of Financial Markets 203 (1998); Michael J. Brennan & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Market 
Microstructure and Assets Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, 41 Journal of 
Financial Economics 441 (1996).   
41  See Klock, supra note [ ], at 299. 
42  Fox et al., supra note [ ], at 345-346 and corresponding notes. 
43  Fox et al., supra note [ ], at 339 and corresponding notes.  For empirical evidence that the efficiency 
of capital allocation in the economy is positively correlated with more accurate stock prices (i.e., stock 
prices that reflect more firm-specific information), see Wurgler, supra note [ ]. 
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 share-value-maximizing behavior.44
“Share price accuracy is a function of two core determinants.  One is the amount 
of information concerning a firm’s future distributions that exists in the hands of one or 
more persons in the world.  The other is the extent to which price reflects this 
information.”45  Insider trading potentially impacts both of these determinants of share 
price accuracy.   
b. The Law and Economics Debate about Insider Trading and Share 
Price Accuracy 
Firms may directly affect the accuracy of their share prices by regularly disclosing 
information.  However, although corporate disclosure is beneficial, it is also costly.46  
Disclosure is a public good in that firms bear most of the (private) costs of disclosure, but 
do not reap its full benefits, which are dispersed among the firm and the public, which 
includes rival firms and investors.47  In some cases, disclosure might even be detrimental 
to the firm’s own investors by revealing too much too soon.  Thus, firms might engage in 
less than the socially optimal amount of disclosure.48   
In Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Professor Manne argues that insider 
trading enables a firm to improve the accuracy of its stock’s price relative to its true value 
                                                 
44  Fox et al., supra note [ ], at 340 and corresponding notes. 
45  Fox et al., supra note [ ], at 346 and corresponding notes. 
46  See George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 Accounting 
Review 515 (1969).  For a comparative empirical study of the determinants of voluntary corporate 
disclosure, see Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts, & Sidney J. Gray, Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual 
Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational Corporations, 26 J. of International 
Business Studies 555 (1995). 
47 A public good is a good that is impossible to exclude parties from consuming and that one person’s 
consumption of does not decrease the amount that other consumers may consume of such good.  Hal R. 
Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 414 (1992).  In general, the government or other public institutions (like 
voting) rather than private markets are the most efficient providers of public goods.  Id. at 415, 417-428.  
Consequently, if stock price accuracy and stock market liquidity are public goods, private contracting 
might not yield the optimal amount and regulation might be the best way to attain the optimal amount of 
these ”goods”. 
48  See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
The Rate and Direction of Economic Activity: Economic and Social Factors, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Conference Series (1962); John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 Virginia Law Review 717 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market Failure]; Merritt Fox, 
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor Empowerment, 85 Virginia 
Law Review 1335 (1999).  The socially optimal amount of disclosure lies somewhere between no 
disclosure and complete disclosure.  Firms probably disclose less than is socially optimal, which 
presumably explains why the law compels disclosure through mandatory disclosure rules.  Mandatory 
disclosure supplements firms’ voluntary disclosure of information that is relevant to the value of their 
shares. 
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 without incurring the costs associated with premature disclosure of firm-specific 
information.49  Similarly, Professors Carlton and Fischel argue that insider trading is less 
costly than traditional disclosure:50
Through insider trading, a firm can convey information it could not 
feasibly announce publicly because an announcement would destroy the 
value of the information, would be too expensive, not believable, or – 
owing to the uncertainty of the information – would subject the firm to 
massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be incorrect.51   
When insiders trade on the basis of private information (e.g., a new discovery, an 
impending merger, etc.) prices will adjust to reflect the news, but without prematurely 
revealing the underlying information to the market.52  Professor Manne argues that this 
mechanism of price adjustment is more efficient than prohibiting insiders from trading 
and therefore delaying the incorporation of information (that the firm is unwilling or 
unable immediately to disclose) into the stock’s price.53
 In contrast, advocates of insider trading regulation question its utility as a cheap 
substitute for traditional disclosure methods on several grounds.  First, they argue that 
insider trading is likely to distort managers’ incentives to disclose information in a timely 
manner.54  Insiders’ ability to profit from insider trading depends fundamentally on their 
superior access to information.  The more that they can control the leakage of 
information, the more they stand to gain from insider trading.  This might include 
hoarding information to the detriment of both price accuracy55 and the firm’s operational 
efficiency.56  In the worst case, insider trading might reduce stock price accuracy by 
                                                 
49  See Manne, supra note [ ], at 80-91; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, 
and the Dog that Did Not Bark, ICER Working Paper No. 7-2005 (2005), at 4 and references at note 10 
therein. 
50  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 868. 
51 Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 868.                                                   
52  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 879.                                             
53  See Manne, supra note [ ], at 86-90, Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying text. 
54  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 52.                                                                                                                                            
55  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 51. 
56  See Haft, supra note [ ], at 313-315. 
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 increasing corporate insiders’ incentives to manipulate information disclosure in order to 
maximize their trading profits. 57
Second, it might be difficult for outsiders to detect insiders’ trades.  One reason is 
that insiders might deliberately hide their trading, in order to “preserve their 
informational monopolies, even if their activities were legal.”58  
It will be very costly to detect an insider’s trades, because he can hide his 
trading activity.  He can buy stock in street names or through nominees 
(including trusts and family members); he may route orders through a 
chain of brokers to make tracing difficult; the list of evasive devices is 
long.59  
If insiders are able to hide their trades, insider trading will be difficult to discern.  Even if 
insiders do not deliberately hide their trades, they might avoid taking large positions due 
to risk aversion.  If insiders’ trades are insufficiently large, they will be undetectable and 
thus might fail to convey new information.60  In addition, the more “noise” there is 
surrounding an inside trade, the lower its informational value.61   
Finally, proponents of insider trading regulation argue that even if insiders do not 
hide their trades or delay disclosure in order to monopolize insider trading profits, 
whatever advantage insider trading might have over traditional disclosure is probably 
very small.  The argument for insider trading as an alternative means of disclosure is 
strongest when the information in question is the kind of information that managers have 
little ability or incentive to disclose.62  
Familiar examples include complex or ‘soft’ information that cannot be 
communicated effectively, bad news that might embarrass incumbent 
                                                 
57  See Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 51; Cox, supra note [ ], at 648.  See also Roland Benabou & Guy 
Laroque, Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility, 107 Q.J. 
ECON. 921 (1992) (presenting an economic model demonstrating the effect of private information on 
insiders’ incentives to manipulate the market with deliberately misleading announcements). 
58  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50. 
59  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50.  
60  See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 574-579 (describing how uninformed investors might infer the nature of inside information by 
observing trading volume or price movements due to insider trading, particularly if they are able to infer 
the identity of the inside traders).  
61  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 868; Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50. 
62  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50. 
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 managers, and good news that cannot be released directly without aiding 
an issuer’s competitors or upsetting ongoing negotiations.63   
In the case of these kinds of information, allowing insider trading might do more to 
update prices than public announcement, as Professors Manne, Carlton and Fischel argue.  
However, for most types of information, traditional disclosure seems relatively cheap.64
2. Insider Trading and Stock Market Liquidity 
a. The Meaning and Economic Significance of Stock Market Liquidity 
As finance scholar David Lesmond notes, “[l]iquidity, by its very nature, is 
difficult to define and even more difficult to estimate.”65  Similarly, finance scholar 
Albert Kyle writes, “liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept.”  However, the general 
view in the finance literature seems to be that stock market liquidity refers to the 
transaction costs of trading, direct or indirect.66  A liquid stock market has relatively low 
trading costs, while an illiquid stock market has relatively high trading costs.   Like 
accurate stock prices, a liquid stock market is important to efficient capital allocation in 
the economy.  In addition, theoretical and empirical research suggests that lower liquidity 
costs (more liquid stock markets) are associated with a lower cost of capital and higher 
market valuation.67  An important issue in the law and economics debate about insider 
trading is whether it has a detrimental effect on stock market liquidity. 
b. The Law and Economics Debate about Insider Trading and Stock 
Market Liquidity 
Insider trading is profitable due to the asymmetry of information between insiders 
and outsiders.  On average, when an insider sells her firm’s stock, she sells for more than 
the stock’s ‘true’ worth and when she buys her firm’s stock, she buys at less than its 
                                                 
63  Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 51.   
64  See Michael Manove, The Harm in Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q. J. ECON. 823, 
826-827 (1989). 
65  David A. Lesmond, Liquidity of Emerging Markets, 77 Journal of Financial Economics 411, 412 
(2005). 
66  Lesmond, supra note [ ], at 412.   
67  For theoretical proof of the positive relationship between liquidity costs and the firm’s cost of capital, 
see Amihud & Mendelson, supra note [ ]; Barclay & Smith, supra note [ ]; Jacoby et al., supra note [ ].  
But see Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993) (arguing that 
excessive liquidity could harm corporate performance by reducing dominant shareholders’ incentive to 
monitor managers).  For empirical evidence that greater liquidity is associated with a lower cost of capital, 
see Chalmers & Kadlec, supra note [ ]; Datar et al., supra note [ ]; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, supra note [ 
].  
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 ‘true’ value.68  The difference between the insider’s purchase or sell price and the ‘true’ 
value is the premium she receives due to having superior information relative to 
outsiders.  This premium represents a trading cost to less informed counter-parties.69  
Thus, controlling for other factors, a market characterized by pervasive insider trading 
might be less liquid than a market in which insider trading is less severe.70  If information 
asymmetry is extreme, uninformed investors may refrain from trading altogether, 
rendering the stock market fully illiquid.71
Opponents of insider trading regulation dismiss its potential adverse effect on 
liquidity.  In particular, the fact that uninformed investors trade frequently implies that 
they are not hindered by the existence of more informed parties, whether or not the latter 
are insiders.72  That uniformed investors trade in spite of asymmetric information might 
suggest that their trading decisions are independent of trading costs.73  Indeed, 
uninformed investors might trade precisely because of informed trading, which increases 
the accuracy of stock prices: 
That trade occurs suggests that traders either do not believe they are 
uninformed or realize that enough informed trading occurs for the 
prevailing prices to reflect most material information.74   
                                                 
68  See Manove, supra note [ ], at 823-824. 
69  See Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 48-49 (“insider trading functions as a trading tax on outsiders”); 
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure 
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993) (“Informed 
traders ‘take’ part of the stock market returns from the uninformed traders….This ‘taking’ thus resembles a 
transaction cost since it can be avoided by not trading”); Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 
1251-53, 1260-1262 and corresponding notes.    
70  Id. Even Professors Carlton and Fischel, staunch opponents of banning insider trading, acknowledge 
that “insider trading could be detrimental to the extent it reduces liquidity.”  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ 
], at 879. 
71  Professor Akerlof established the theoretical connection between information asymmetry and market 
failure, showing that markets malfunction when there is asymmetric information and may break down 
entirely in cases of extreme information asymmetry.  George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84. Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  For evidence that insider trading laws 
and enforcement are associated with more liquid stock markets, see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 
The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2002). 
72  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 879-880. 
73  See id.  See also David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449, 1457 (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model] (observing that 
uninformed investors “will follow a ‘buy and hold’ strategy [and] [b]ecause they trade infrequently, they 
will be relatively insensitive to the bid-ask spread charged by market makers”). 
74  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 880. 
 
 
181
18
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 35 [2006]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art35
 In other words, the benefits of improved price accuracy might offset the potential costs of 
trading against better-informed counter-parties. 
Opponents of insider trading regulation argue further that some investors will 
always be more informed than others.  “Smart brokers…cause the same problems as 
smart insiders. Uninformed traders who know they are uninformed should not trade in 
either situation.”75  Insider trading laws cannot eliminate this phenomenon.  Rather, 
prohibiting insider trading simply redistributes (but does not reduce) the profits from 
informed trading from insiders to market professionals and other informed traders.76  As a 
result, banning insider trading will not reduce the cost of trading, opponents of insider 
trading regulation argue.77   
However, some proponents of insider trading regulation argue that prohibiting 
insider trading will reduce the cost of trading by increasing competition among informed 
traders.  There are essentially two competing groups of informed traders, corporate 
insiders and informed outsiders (e.g., investment analysts, hedge fund and mutual fund 
managers, etc.).  Insiders have a clear advantage over informed outsiders, since the latter 
generally are not privy to non-public corporate information, while insiders are always 
privy to such information.  If insiders are allowed freely to trade on non-public corporate 
information (i.e., if insider trading is legal), they have a virtual monopoly on the profits 
from informed trading.78  This discourages informed outsiders from investing in 
information gathering and analysis and there are thus fewer informed outsiders in the 
market.  Conversely, if insider trading is banned, more informed outsiders will participate 
in the market.  In turn, because there are more of them, none with monopoly access to 
                                                 
75  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 879-880. 
76  David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America: The 
Economics of the Politics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 149 (Graf 
von der Schulenburg et al. eds., Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Controlling 
Insider Trading]; David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest 
Model with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987) [hereinafter 
Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand].  Consistent with this, a recent empirical study finds that 
analyst following increases after countries’ initial enforcement of insider trading laws.  Robert M. 
Bushman, Joseph D. Piotroski, & Abbie J. Smith, Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts’ Incentives to 
Follow Firms, 60 J. FIN. 35 (2005). 
77 Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note [ ], at [ ].  However, uninformed investors 
may not know they are uninformed and/or while they may be willing to pay a moderate premium 
(brokerage fee) reflecting their information disadvantage relative to more informed traders, they might be 
unwilling to pay the very high fees that might result if they are trading against corporate insiders. 
78  See Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ], 20-30.  
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 corporate information, the information market will be more competitive.  A more 
competitive market for information implies lower total profits from informed trading, 
relative to a world in which insider trading is legal and insiders have monopolistic access 
to information.  This presumably translates into lower trading costs79 and more accurate 
stock prices.80
Critics of insider trading regulation respond that if insider trading were harmful to 
liquidity, firms would voluntarily prohibit it because greater liquidity is valuable.81  
Therefore, they argue, the fact that firms do not voluntarily proscribe insider trading 
therefore suggests that it does not harm liquidity.82  However, supporters of insider 
trading regulation argue that the reason why firms and their shareholders do not pre-
commit to ban insider trading is because greater liquidity is a public good which firms 
systematically under-provide: 
even if firms know the true correlation of price and transaction costs, they 
may still reduce transaction costs less than is socially desirable if there is a 
benefit to society from low transaction costs and market liquidity which 
firms do not enjoy (in essence, transaction costs are [a positive] 
externality).83   
Because firms have insufficient incentives to provide liquidity by banning insider trading 
themselves, markets must rely on government regulation, proponents of regulation 
argue.84  The question of whether firms and shareholders would voluntarily prohibit 
insider trading if it were harmful is another controversial theme in the law and economics 
debate, to which this article now turns briefly. 
 
                                                 
79  See Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ], at 17.  
80  See discussion infra at Part III.B. 
81  Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note [ ], at [ ].  For empirical evidence that 
greater liquidity is associated with a lower cost of capital for the firm, see Chalmers & Kadlec, supra note [ 
]; Datar et al., supra note [ ]; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, supra note [ ]. 
82  Many U.S. and Canadian firms do have voluntary insider trading policies that go beyond the 
requirements of insider trading regulations.  See J.C. Bettis, J.L. Coles & M.L. Lemmon, Corporate 
Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 Journal of Financial Economics 191 (2000); Anita Anand and 
Laura Beny, Are Insider Trading Policies an Effective Means to Reduce Agency Costs?, Unpublished 
working paper (on file with the author). 
83  Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ], at 69, n 34 and corresponding text. 
84  Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ], at 17.  See also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1261-
1262 (explaining why private firms and shareholders will not privately provide sufficient liquidity to the 
stock market). 
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 c. A “Coasian” Approach to Insider Trading:  Private Contracting 
 In addition to the question whether insider trading is harmful or beneficial and to 
whom, another aspect of the law and economics debate about insider trading is the issue 
of who should regulate insider trading, the government or private parties?  Professors 
Carlton and Fischel advocate private negotiations between firms and insiders.  They 
argue that the question is essentially a question about the optimal allocation of the 
property right in corporate information, a decision they believe is most efficiently made 
by private parties: 
Whether insider trading is beneficial depends on whether the property 
right in information is more valuable to the firm’s managers or to the 
firm’s investors.  In either case, the parties can engage in a value-
maximizing exchange by allocating the property right in information to its 
highest-valuing user.  If the critics of insider trading are correct, therefore, 
both the firm’s investors and the firm’s insiders could profit by banning 
insider trading, thereby allocating the property right in information to the 
firm’s investors.85
 Two observations about the contractual approach are worth mentioning.  First, 
law and economics scholars who advocate private contracts over insider trading 
regulation confine their investigation of the optimal allocation of the property right in 
corporate information to within the boundaries of the firm.86  The property right is 
assignable by contract either to the firm (shareholders) or to insiders, by this approach, 
which is based on the notion of the firm as a nexus of contracts.87  Second, the contractual 
argument rests on the applicability of the Coase theorem, which states that, in the absence 
of transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities, private parties will allocate property 
                                                 
85  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 863. 
86  See e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ] (investigating whether shareholders or insiders should have 
the property right to valuable corporate information); Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model, supra note [ ] 
(investigating whether shareholders or insiders should have the property right to valuable corporate 
information); Jonathan R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 4 (observing that 
“the debate about insider trading is really a debate about how to allocate a property right within the firm”) 
[hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model].  For a critique of this narrow focus, see Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1233 (arguing “that existing analysis is misguided as it rests on the 
erroneous assumption that property rights to inside information must be allocated within the boundaries of 
the firm—namely, either to shareholders or to managers” and, for that reason, overlooks “the possibility of 
awarding the property right of inside information” to third parties outside the firm, like market analysts).   
87  See Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model, supra note [ ], at 1, n 1. 
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 rights (resources) to their most efficient uses.88  Applying the Coase theorem to insider 
trading, some law and economics scholars contend that if there were no government 
regulation firms and shareholders would privately negotiate the optimal allocation of the 
property right in corporate information.89  For some firms this would imply permitting 
insiders to trade on private information, while for other firms, it would imply prohibiting 
insiders to trade on private information.90  Competitive labor, capital, and product 
markets would prevent insiders’ overreaching the terms of insider trading contracts,91 
which may be either publicly or private enforced.92  But the Coase Theorem does not 
describe the world in which insider trading contracts would be negotiated because, in the 
real world, transactions costs exist. 
 The two main transaction costs are: (1) negotiation costs and (2) enforcement 
costs.  Advocates of private contracting argue that the costs of negotiating insider trading 
contracts between firms and insiders would be minimal.93  Professors Haddock and 
Macey argue further that the actual drafting costs are de minimis, since “a firm’s articles 
of incorporation represent a preexisting contractual relationship between shareholders 
and managers.”94  As a result, it would be simply a matter of dropping a line or two 
(prohibiting or allowing insider trading) into the preexisting corporate contract.  Critics of 
                                                 
88  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1, 10 (1960). 
89  They analogize insider trading to other forms of managerial compensation, which are addressed via 
private contract.  See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 861-862 (“Salaries, bonuses, stock options, 
office size, vacation leave, secretarial support, and other terms of employment are all…properly left to 
private negotiation.  Nobody would argue seriously that these terms and conditions of employment should 
be set by government regulation…Most would agree that these decisions are better made through 
negotiations between firms and managers, given the constraints of capital, product, and labor markets as 
well as the market for corporate control.”) 
90  See Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 866 (“[T]he allocation of the property right in valuable 
information to managers might not be optimal in all circumstances for every firm.  But even if some firms 
would attempt to ban insider trading in the absence of regulation, other firms should nonetheless be able to 
opt out of the regulations if they so desire.  No justification exists for precluding firms from contracting 
around a regulatory prohibition of insider trading”).  See also Haddock & Macey, Coasian Model, supra 
note [ ], at 1467-1468 (suggesting that some firms will desire a prohibition against insider trading, while 
other firms will not). 
91  Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ] at 862-863. 
92  See Carlton and Fischel, supra note [ ], at 890.  But see Easterbrook, Evidentiary Privileges, supra 
note [], at 334-335 (suggesting that public enforcement of private insider trading contracts might be better 
than private enforcement of such contracts); Haddock and Macey, Coasian Model, supra note [ ], at 1462, 
n. 28 (suggesting that stock exchanges might be efficient enforcers of private insider trading contracts 
between firms and shareholders).   
93  See Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 863. 
94  Haddock & Macey, supra note [ ], at 1449, n. 1. 
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 the “Coasian” approach do not see the costs as so slight.95  One obvious cost is the cost of 
overcoming collective action problems among dispersed shareholders; another is the 
investment the parties would have to make to learn whether allowing insider trading is in 
their interest.  Critics also argue that the costs of enforcing private prohibitions of insider 
trading would be high.  Judge Easterbrook, for example, argues that it is too easy for 
insiders to hide their trading and that it is too costly for firms to determine when an inside 
trade is based on “material” information.96  Consequently, “[t]he overwhelming majority 
of violations will be go undetected.”97  If private contracts prohibiting insider trading are 
not enforceable, firms will not write them in the first place, even if it is in their private (or 
the social) interest to do so,98 or managers will write them for their private gain in the 
event that shareholders do not recognize their unenforcability.  If the contracts are 
enforceable, enforcement is itself a cost and, as is evident with shareholder derivative 
suits, the costs can be huge. 
 A second criticism of the “Coasian” approach to insider trading is that the 
assumption of zero external effects is unrealistic.  The Coase theorem requires that all 
affected parties are privy to the negotiations.  However, insider trading within the firm 
probably has spillover effects on non-shareholders, including other firms and the stock 
market generally.99  In addition, intra-firm negotiations over insider trading exclude 
future shareholders, upon whom insider trading is also likely to have an impact.100  Judge 
Easterbrook articulates the concern that firms that prohibit insider trading may not be 
able to capture the gains of doing so because of free-riding by firms that do not prohibit 
insider trading.101  Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky argue that, in their private 
                                                 
95  See, e.,g., Klock, supra note [ ], at 315 (“Firms have agency costs, and negotiations between managers 
and shareholders are not costless.”)    
96  Easterbrook, supra note [ ], at 91-93. 
97  Id. at 92. 
98  Id. at 91 (“No firm has an incentive to suppress trading by its insiders on material information unless 
the private gains of doing so exceed the private costs”).  But see Carlton & Fischel, supra note [ ], at 865 
(arguing that perfect enforcement is not required and that imperfect enforcement will yield gains that 
exceed the costs of contracting, if insider trading is detrimental to investors). 
99  See generally Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ](discussing the spillover effects of insider 
trading on stock market liquidity and the market for information).  For an interesting analysis of the 
potential spillover effects of outside trading, see Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider 
Trading, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313. 
100  See Klock, supra note [ ], at 317. 
101  Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, supra note [ ], at 94-95.  Easterbrook’s concern 
is that firms that do not ban insider trading will mimic firms that do and thus the market will be unable to 
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 negotiations with insiders, firms will not consider the external benefits of prohibiting 
insider trading on market efficiency as reflected in more accurate stock prices and greater 
stock market liquidity.102  Therefore, private contracting will lead to less than the socially 
optimal level of curtailment of insider trading among firms.  The empirical results in Part 
IV have important implications for this issue.103
 Third, critics of the private contracting approach argue that uncertainty and 
asymmetric information will deter efficient private bargaining in the context of insider 
trading.  Professor Cox, for example, contends that precisely because of the secret, non-
transparent nature of insider trading, it is impossible for shareholders and insiders 
efficiently to contract over whether to allow it or not.  This is because efficient 
contracting requires “that parties know the costs and benefits of their actions.”104  Such 
knowledge seems unattainable in the insider trading context:  
[S]tockholders must not only be able to quantify the benefits—such as 
increased efficiency and more aggressive entrepreneurial activity—that 
they will receive from licensing managers to trade on confidential 
corporate information, but they also must know whether and by what 
amount these benefits will be accompanied by costs such as abusive 
insider-trading practices.  [However,] it is difficult to quantify the gains 
attributable to entrepreneurial activity generally, let alone the gains 
attributable to each individual manager’s contribution toward these 
benefits. 
 Moreover, the costs of insider trading are open-ended….the 
opposite trader’s insider-trading costs are beyond quantification.  
Furthermore, hidden costs associated with various abusive insider-trading 
practices must also be taken into account….the existence and magnitude 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinguish between the two types of firms.  Such mimicry, if successful, will cause the market to over-
discount the shares of the firms that ban insider trading and under-discount the shares of the firms that do 
not ban insider trading but pretend that they do.  Id.   
102  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1264. 
103  See discussion infra at Part V. 
104  Cox, supra note [ ], at 653. 
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 of such costs pose an insolvable problem, especially in the context of ex 
ante contracting.105   
In this respect, insider trading profits are distinguishable from other more transparent 
forms of managerial compensation that firms and shareholders regularly contract over.106   
 The debate about whether private contracting is more efficient than government 
regulation of insider trading is closely related to the debate about whether insider trading 
is efficient.  If insider trading is solely an agency issue, private contract might be an 
efficient way of addressing it within the firm.  But, even in this case, public regulation 
may be superior to private contract for the reasons discussed above.  However, if insider 
trading is detrimental to stock markets (that is, if insider trading has effects beyond the 
firm level), any argument in favor of private contract is greatly diminished, if not 
obliterated, notwithstanding the fact that an individual firm and its shareholders might be 
privately satisfied with a contractual approach to insider trading. 
II. Testable Hypotheses 
Until recently, the law and economics debate about the desirability of regulating 
insider trading has been largely theoretical.  Although scholars interested in insider 
trading have articulated highly refined theoretical arguments, these arguments, as we 
have seen, are offsetting, and actual knowledge of the effects of insider trading has not 
been advanced due to the dearth of empirical evidence.  In this Part, I will draw on the 
theoretical law and economics literature and scholarship in financial economics, to 
formulate three testable hypotheses.  I will also discuss the few empirical studies done to 
date that bear on these hypotheses.   
A. Insider Trading Law and Ownership Concentration 
Judge Easterbrook notes that there have been few empirical assessments of the 
competing agency theories of insider trading.107  One reason is the indeterminacy of 
                                                 
105  Cox, supra note [ ], at 654. 
106  But see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that executive compensation methods often 
obscure the amount of executive pay and the weak link between executive pay and performance). 
107  Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, at 89-90 (“There must be some effort to verify 
that the models’ predictions describe the world.  Efforts to verify the assessments provided by the agency 
models have been few and unsatisfactory.”) 
 
 
252
25
Beny:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
 theoretical agency models.108  Another reason is that, “even with data the problem may be 
insoluble.”109  Mindful of these limitations, I first propose to indirectly test the agency 
implications of insider trading by examining how insider trading laws relate to ownership 
concentration.  Concentrated corporate ownership has both costs and benefits.  On the 
one hand, concentrated corporate ownership might improve monitoring and therefore 
increase firm value.110  On the other hand, if ownership is too concentrated, large 
investors might be insufficiently diversified and firms might find it difficult to raise 
equity finance.111   
Professor Maug presents a formal model in which insider trading might increase 
ownership concentration and agency costs.  He shows that, under some circumstances, 
countries with more lax insider trading laws will have more concentrated corporate 
ownership.112  In his mathematical model, there are three relevant parties: managers, 
large/dominant shareholders, and small shareholders.  Large shareholders have two 
choices: (1) they may monitor managers and thereby mitigate agency costs, which 
benefits small shareholders and increases corporate value, or (2) they may collude with 
managers and expropriate private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders and 
corporate value.  Insider trading law comes into play in the model in the following way.  
Large shareholders are more likely to monitor managers and company performance 
(option (1)) when insider trading is illegal.  In this manner, banning insider trading aligns 
the interests of dominant and small shareholders.  In contrast, when insider trading is not 
illegal, managers may bribe large shareholders not to monitor them by sharing inside 
                                                 
108  Id. at 89 (“the theoretical work is indeterminate”).  Judge Easterbrook suggests the following tests of 
the agency theories: “look at the relation between insiders’ trading and other forms of compensation” or, 
more promising, “search for substitution between insider trading and other agency-cost-control devices”, 
“look for price changes at times of changes in approaches to insider trading”, examine “[w]hat happens 
when insider trading is detected at a given firm and prosecuted.” Id. at 96-97.  Easterbrook cautions, 
however, that “[i]t would be foolish to put too much confidence in these tests.”  Id at 97. 
109  Id. at 97. 
110  See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note [ ], at 343-349 (discussing the incentive effects of 
managerial (inside) ownership); Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return, 
76 AMER. ECON. REV. 313 (1986) (arguing that large shareholders play an important role in corporate 
monitoring); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 461 (1986) (presenting a theoretical model showing that large shareholders may sometimes monitor 
managers and thereby increase firm value); Bhide, supra note [ ] (stressing the positive role of large 
shareholders in corporate governance). 
111  La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at 1151. 
112  Ernst Maug, Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance, 46 European Economic Review 
1569 (2002) [hereinafter, Maug, Insider Trading Legislation]. 
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 information on which large shareholders may profitably trade (option (2)).  Thus, when 
insider trading is legal, insider trading profits are an opportunity cost of monitoring for 
large shareholders.  If these profits are sufficiently high, dominant shareholders will 
forego monitoring altogether and collude with managers “to conceal adverse information 
and protect managers’ private benefits from control” as well as their own trading 
profits.113  As a result, small investors will be more reluctant to invest in corporate shares 
when insider trading legislation is weak because the risk of expropriation by managers 
and dominant shareholders is high and therefore equity ownership will be more 
concentrated.114
 In cross-country comparisons, Professors La Porta et al. find that countries with 
weaker investor legal protections tend to have more concentrated corporate ownership.115  
La Porta et al. propose two reasons for this finding: 
First, large, or even dominant shareholders who monitor the managers 
might need to own more capital, ceteris paribus, to exercise their control 
rights and thus to avoid being expropriated by the managers….Second, 
when they are poorly protected, small investors might be willing to buy 
corporate shares only at such low prices that make it unattractive for 
corporations to issue new shares to the public.  Such low demand for 
corporate shares by minority investors would indirectly stimulate 
ownership concentration….with poor investor protection, ownership 
concentration becomes a substitute for legal protection, because only large 
shareholders can hope to receive a return on their investment.116
                                                 
113  Maug, Insider Trading Legislation, supra note [ ], at 1585.  Another condition is that the stock market 
is sufficiently liquid.  Id. at 1583. 
114  Professor Maug argues that insider trading legislation is “a prerequisite for dispersed ownership 
and liquid public markets.”  Maug, Insider Trading Legislation, supra note [ ], at 1588. See also Ausubel, 
supra note [ ], at 1023 (presenting a theoretical model in which insider trading might reduce outsiders’ 
willingness to participate in the stock market and showing that a “disclose or abstain rule” increases 
investor confidence, defined as “the rational belief…that their return on investment is not being diluted by 
insiders’ trading”).  But see Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter?  The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2001) (arguing that “a highly specific set of 
laws governing companies and financial markets does not need to be in place for [dispersed equity 
ownership] to become predominant,” as long as “alternative institutional structures can perform the 
function the ‘law matters’ thesis implies the legal system needs to play”).   
115  La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]. 
116  La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at 1145. 
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 The fact that countries with weaker investor protection tend to have more 
concentrated ownership alone does not imply that agency costs are greater in countries 
with weaker investor protections or that agency costs are lower in countries with stronger 
investor protections, since ownership structure might be an efficient adaptation to the 
legal environment.117  However, it is at least consistent with such an interpretation. 
Synthesizing Professor La Porta et al.’s findings with Professor Maug’s theorizing 
suggests that if prohibiting insider trading is a form of investor protection and, in 
particular, if ownership concentration is a way of dealing with agency costs, ceteris 
paribus, ownership will tend to be more concentrated in countries with relatively lax 
insider trading laws, if insider trading increases agency costs.  This is the first testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  Countries with tougher insider trading laws have 
more outside ownership (greater ownership dispersion).  Conversely, 
countries with weaker insider trading laws have more concentrated 
ownership.   
But as with Professor La Porta et al.’s results, even if the evidence strongly 
supports the hypothesis, there will be some ambiguity of interpretation.  In 
particular, finding an inverse relationship between insider trading laws and 
ownership concentration does not necessarily imply that insider trading is costly 
to the firm.  Concentrated ownership may be an endogenous mechanism for 
controlling agency costs and insider trading profits might be a way to compensate 
large investors for assuming undiversified positions and engaging in valuable 
corporate monitoring.118  
B. Insider Trading Law and the Information Content of Stock Prices 
One’s view of how the market for corporate information works is likely to 
influence one’s perspective on the effect of insider trading on stock price accuracy.  Thus, 
opponents and proponents of insider trading regulation seem to have conflicting 
understandings of how the market for corporate information works (or should work).  
Opponents of insider trading laws tend to focus on intra-firm information markets, while 
                                                 
117  Id. 
118  See Bhide, supra note [ ], at 317; Demsetz, supra note [ ], at 315.   
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 proponents of regulation tend to look beyond the firm to the broader market context.119  
The relevant policy inquiry for first the group is whether the property right in corporate 
information should be assigned to insiders or to the firm (shareholders).120  In contrast, 
the second group takes a more comprehensive view of the market for corporate 
information and sees strong public good features in corporate information.121  
Professors Goshen and Parkomovsky, proponents of insider trading regulation, 
posit four types of participants in the capital market: insiders, information traders (or 
analysts), liquidity traders, and noise traders, which they define as follows: 
Insiders have access to inside information due to their proximity to the 
firm.  They also have the knowledge and ability to evaluate this 
information and to price it. 
Information traders, the second group, lack access to inside information, 
but are willing and able to devote resources to gathering and analyzing 
information as a basis for their trading…. 
[L]iquidity traders, [do] not collect and evaluate information; rather, their 
investment reflects their individual allocation of resources between 
savings and consumption….if rational, [they] will follow a strategy of 
buying and holding a portfolio of shares. 
Finally, noise traders…act irrationally, following different methods of 
investment either as individuals or as a group.  Noise traders often believe 
that they are in possession of valuable information and invest as if they are 
information traders.  In such cases, other market participants cannot 
separate noise traders from true information traders.122  
Only trading by insiders and information traders (stock market analysts) is likely to 
enhance stock price accuracy.  Both of these groups utilize the information that they have 
                                                 
119  Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1232 (arguing that some “Law and Economics scholars 
have limited the list of potential entitlement holders to two: the managers and the shareholders….the scope 
of the inquiry has been restricted to the boundaries of the firm.”)  They contrast “insider-based information 
market” with “analyst-based information market”.  Id. at 1237. 
120  As we have seen, opponents of insider trading regulation favor either assigning this property right 
to insiders or relegating allocation of this right to private contract, with such allocation to be determined on 
a firm by firm basis.   
121  See, e.g., Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note, at 1232, 1258 (Describing the public good 
attributes of corporate information). 
122  Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1239-1240. 
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 in order to profit from a divergence between a stock’s true value and its current market 
price.123  They buy when the stock is undervalued, causing its price to rise, and they sell 
when the stock is overvalued, causing its price to fall.  In this manner, both insiders and 
information traders improve stock price accuracy. 
It should be fairly obvious why insiders’ trading might enhance stock price 
accuracy.  They are privy to firm-specific information before it is disclosed to the public.  
When they have material firm-specific information that nobody else has, they are the first 
to perceive and to trade on such information.  Their trading moves the stock price in the 
correct direction, as other market participants infer the existence of new information by 
observing trading volume and price movements.124  Information traders, who compete 
with inside traders, also enhance stock price accuracy.  Unlike insiders’ however, they are 
not privy to firm-specific information before it is publicly disclosed.  Instead, they invest 
time and resources in discovering and analyzing general market information and firm-
specific information.125  Their analysis of this information enables them to value a stock 
and to determine whether its current market price diverges from their estimated 
valuation.126  The profits that informed traders earn from trading against less informed 
parties give them the incentive to conduct research and analysis.127   
When insider trading is legal, informed traders are at a clear disadvantage relative 
to insiders, who will systematically beat them.128  The amount of trading by informed 
traders is, according to Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky’s model, therefore 
inversely related to the amount of insider trading.  When insider trading is legal, 
information traders will reap a lower return on their investment in information gathering 
and analysis and therefore conduct less of both.  Thus, Professors Goshen and 
                                                 
123  Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note, at 1239. 
124  See generally Manne, surpa note [ ], at 86-90 (describing how insider trading moves the stock price in 
the “correct” direction).  See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 574-579 (describing how investors 
might infer the nature of the inside information by observing trading volume or price movements, 
particularly if they are able to infer the identity of the inside traders).  
125  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1237-1238. 
126  Id. 
127  See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 
23 Rand Journal of Economics 106 (1992) (presenting a formal model of the effect of insider trading on 
informed traders’ incentives to acquire information and trade).  See also, Jhinyoung Shin, The Optimal 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 Journal of Financial Intermediation 49, 59-61 (1996) (showing the effect 
of insider trading on market professionals’ trading profits).   
128  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1240. 
 
 
303
30
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 35 [2006]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art35
 Parchomovsky expect insider trading to stifle the development of an analyst market.129  In 
contrast, if insider trading is illegal, “a competitive analysts market will form, according 
to Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky.”130  “This substitution effect between insiders 
and analysts is the key to understanding the ban on insider trading.”131  The policy 
question that naturally emerges is whether the government should favor one group 
(analysts versus insiders) over the other in setting insider trading policy.  For Professors 
Goshen and Parchomovsky, this inquiry essentially boils down to: “which group—
insiders or analysts—is better able to” promote price accuracy?132   
 Some proponents of insider trading regulation, including Professors Goshen and 
Parchomovsky, argue that analyst trading yields more efficient stock prices than insider 
trading, since informed traders are more adept than insiders at pricing both firm-specific 
and general market information.133  There is considerable support for this position in the 
finance literature.  Finance scholars have long noted the superiority of (non-insider) 
informed traders relative to insiders in promoting efficient stock prices.134  Presumably, 
informed investors’ trading generates more informative stock prices than insiders’ trading 
because the external market for information is more competitive than the internal 
information market.135  If it is true that analyst (informed) trading yields more efficient 
price discovery than insiders’ trading, stock prices will be less informative when insider 
trading is legal, since there will be less informed trading when insiders may freely trade 
on the basis of private information.  This leads to the second testable hypothesis. 
                                                 
129  Id. at 1241-1243. 
130  Id. at 1243.  See also Fishman & Hagerty, supra note [ ] (presenting an economic model of the effect 
of insider trading on the degree of competition in the market for information, where the competitive parties 
are insiders and informed outsiders); Shin, supra note [ ] (modeling the role of insider trading regulation in 
promoting competition between market professionals (informed traders) and insiders).  For empirical 
evidence that supports this proposition, see Robert M. Bushman, Joseph D. Piotroski, & Abbie J. Smith, 
Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts’ Incentives to Follow Firms, 60 Journal of Finance 35 (2005) 
(finding using cross-country data that analyst participation increases after countries initially enforce their 
insider trading laws).   
131  Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1243. 
132  Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1243. 
133  See, e.g., Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1246-1251. 
134  See, e.g., Kenneth R. French & Richard Roll, Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and 
the Reaction of Traders, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1986); Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive 
Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31. J. FIN. 573 (1976); Randall Morck, Bernard 
Yeung, & Wayne Yu, The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have 
Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000); Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541 
(1988).  
135  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1250-1251 and corresponding notes. 
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 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Countries with more stringent insider trading laws have more 
accurate stock prices.  Conversely, countries with more lax insider trading laws 
have less accurate stock prices. 
C. Insider Trading Law and Liquidity 
Opponents of insider trading regulation believe either that insider trading is not 
detrimental to stock market liquidity or that any harmful impact that it might have on 
liquidity is offset by other benefits.  In contrast, proponents of insider trading regulation 
believe that insider trading compromises stock market liquidity, without offering 
sufficient offsetting benefits, if any.  Insider trading might adversely affect liquidity 
through at least two channels: (1) by raising the transaction cost of trading and (2) by 
reducing the number of informed traders, who provide liquidity to the stock market. 
The first way in which insider trading might reduce stock market liquidity is by 
raising the transaction costs of trading.  Some market microstructure studies in the 
finance literature show that a high degree of asymmetric information among traders can 
lead to greater transaction costs in trading, thus compromising market liquidity.136  
Market makers generally subsidize their trading losses to better informed traders by 
increasing the bid-ask spread, which is the difference between the price at which they are 
willing to sell (offer) and the price at which they are willing to buy (bid) a stock.137  The 
greater the degree of asymmetric information, the greater the bid-ask spread.  This means 
that transaction costs of trading are higher, and therefore stock market liquidity is 
lower.138  Since insider trading is the most extreme form of firm-specific asymmetric 
information, this logic suggests that it should have a greater adverse effect on stock 
market liquidity than other types of informed trading,139 because market makers will raise 
                                                 
136  Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN 1457 (1983); 
Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. 
ECON. 123 (1988); Hayne Leland, Insider Trading: Should it be Prohibited, 100 J. POL. ECON. 859 (1992).  
This work builds on Akerlof’s original insight that markets malfunction in the presence of asymmetric 
information and, in extreme cases, may break down entirely.  George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84. Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
137  Id. 
138  See, e.g., Hans Stoll, Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests, 44 
J. FIN. 115 (1989) (finding that 43% of the bid-ask spread of NASDAQ/National Market System stocks is 
due to adverse information costs). 
139  See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1252 (“The uninformed market maker faces the 
problem of asymmetric information when trading either against analysts or against insiders; both groups 
have an information edge.  However, trading by insiders imposes are much greater risk on the uninformed 
market maker.  Insiders, due to their exclusivity over inside information, can manipulate the timing and 
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 bid-ask spreads to reflect the possibility that they are trading against more informed 
corporate insiders.140   
The second way that insider trading might reduce stock market liquidity is by 
reducing competition in the market for information.  As discussed above, allowing 
insiders to trade on private information gives them a short-term monopoly over an 
important class of valuable information and therefore a monopoly over the trading profits 
enabled by that information.141  The inability to compete successfully in the market for 
relevant information causes informed traders (analysts) to exit the market, leading to 
lower trading volume, since informed traders provide liquidity to the market.142  Informed 
traders are not expected to exit the market entirely because they do have an informational 
advantage relative to market makers, but this advantage is smaller than the insiders’ 
informational advantage relative to market markers.  Consequently, informed trading in a 
stock market in which insider trading is illegal yields lower transaction costs than insider 
trading in a stock market in which insider trading is legal.143   
Hence follows the third testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Countries with more stringent insider trading laws have more 
liquid stock markets.  Conversely, countries with more lax insider trading laws 
have less liquid stock markets. 
 
Thus Part IV will examine empirically the following three hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) Tougher insider trading laws are associated with 
greater outside ownership (i.e., lower ownership 
concentration).    
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Stock prices are more informative when insider 
trading laws are more stringent. 
                                                                                                                                                 
volume of their trades, a fact which increases the risk of the uninformed market maker trading against 
them.”) 
140  See supra note 68.  
141  See Fishman & Hagerty, supra note [ ]; Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ]; Goshen and Parchomovksy, 
supra note [ ], at 1260. 
142  Georgakopoulos, supra note [ ]; Goshen and Parchomovksy, supra note [ ].  Bushman et al., supra 
note [ ]. 
143  See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at 1252 (“analysts, even when enjoying an 
informational advantage, will always hold diverging opinions as to the exact impact of the information on 
stock prices, and their trade orders will therefore diverge from one another.  This, in turn, reduces the risk 
faced by the uninformed market maker.  In addition, because analysts face competition from other analysts, 
they cannot manipulate or time their orders.  Thus, trading by analysts presents the uninformed market 
maker with a much lower risk relative to trading by insiders.”) 
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 Hypothesis 3 (H3) The stock market is more liquid when insider 
trading laws are more stringent.   
 
 
But before I turn to the empirical tests, in the next Part I describe the data.  
III. Description of the Data 
My sample consists of stock market and other economic data from a cross-section 
of 33 countries.  The countries vary along several important dimensions, including the 
efficiency, transparency and regulation of their stock markets, their corporate laws and 
corporate governance structures, their legal traditions, and the quality of their law 
enforcement and other institutions.  The stock markets in the sample range from long-
established and highly developed stock markets to newly emerging stock markets.  Some 
of the markets have relatively strong securities (that is, disclosure and antifraud) laws and 
others have relatively lax securities laws.  They also vary in the strength of their insider 
trading laws and enforcement mechanisms. 
A. Data Sources 
1. The Dependent Variables 
Testing the three hypotheses requires measures of ownership dispersion, stock 
price informativeness, and stock market liquidity. These measures come from several 
sources.  First, the ownership data come from Professors La Porta et al.144  They define 
ownership concentration as the average ownership concentration of the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest private non-financial firms in the economy as of the mid-
1990s.  I define ownership dispersion as one minus Professors La Porta et al.’s ownership 
concentration measure.  Thus defined, ownership dispersion is the average fraction of 
shares owned by all shareholders in the ten largest private non-financial firms in the 
economy, excluding the three largest shareholders in each of these firms.   This 
ownership dispersion measure is admittedly problematic.  I use La Porta et al.’s 
ownership measure because there is no better comparative measure available.  
Nevertheless, I recognize its serious flaws.  The use of only ten companies from the tail 
of the distribution to characterize ownership concentration in the economy at large is 
questionable and the decision to determine concentration within those companies by 
                                                 
144  La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]. 
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 looking at the holdings of three shareholders is somewhat arbitrary.  For these reasons, as 
well as the ambiguity of hypothesis-consistent results pointed out above, the test of H1 is 
necessarily a weak test.   
Second, Morck, Yeung, and Yu’s measure of stock price synchronicity is a proxy 
for stock price informativeness.145  This variable measures the degree to which the stock 
prices of different firms moved together in an average week in 1995.  Greater 
synchronicity (co-movement) of stock returns implies that a larger proportion of stock 
return variation is explained by market-wide than by firm-specific factors, suggesting that 
stock prices are less informative of firm-specific strengths and weaknesses.   
Information on stock market liquidity comes from the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook.146  The IFC reports stock 
market turnover, a common measure of liquidity, which is the ratio of the total value 
traded to total stock market capitalization.147  For each country in the sample, I use the 
average turnover ratio from 1991 through 1995.  Table 1 describes the dependent 
variables. 
2. Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement 
a. Insider Trading Law Variables 
Since most countries with stock exchanges (and all of the countries in the sample) 
forbid corporate insiders to trade on the basis of price-sensitive, private information, I do 
not code this prohibition.148  I code four elements of countries’ insider trading laws as 
                                                 
145  Morck et al., supra note [ ]. 
146  International Finance Corporation’s, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996) [hereinafter Emerging 
Markets Factbook]. 
147  For other common measures of stock market liquidity, see generally Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. 
Harvey, & Christian Lundblad, Liquidity and Expected Returns:  Lessons from Emerging Markets, NBER 
Working Paper No. W11413 (2005); David A. Lesmond, Liquidity of Emerging Markets, 77 Journal of 
Financial Economics 411 (2005). 
148  Price-sensitive information is generally defined as information that would significantly affect the 
stock’s price.  The standards for determining whether information is price-sensitive vary across countries 
and contexts, as Euronext, the pan-European Exchange, notes: “Whether or not information is price 
sensitive depends on factors specific to each individual company, such as its size, recent history and sector 
of activity.  Market sentiment can also have a marked effect on price sensitivity.  Given these 
considerations, it is not possible to produce one definition of price sensitivity that takes all of these factors 
into account.  For the same reason, it is impossible to indicate what percentage increase or decrease in a 
share price qualifies as a ‘significant impact’ on prices” 
http://www.euronext.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_53424/55/32/66175905901789_OA1_Price-sens.pdf (last 
visited April 12, 2006).  Therefore, I do not code price-sensitivity (materiality) standards because to do so 
would require subjective judgments.  I avoid coding scienter requirements and fiduciary standards for the 
same reason.  At any rate, the requirement of a fiduciary nexus between the source of the information and 
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 they existed as of the mid-1990s on the basis of a priori reasoning about which elements 
of insider trading laws are substantively (or, doctrinally) significant, with an emphasis on 
deterrence.149  Taken together, these four elements of each country’s insider trading law 
constitute the overall insider trading law measure for that country. 
The first element, Tipping, equals one if a corporate insider is liable for giving 
price-sensitive, private information to an outsider (so-called “tippee”150) and encouraging 
her to trade, and zero otherwise.  Forbidding a corporate insider to trade on inside 
information, while at the same time allowing her to tip outsiders who subsequently trade, 
is equivalent to allowing the insider to trade on her own behalf.151  In some countries, 
insiders are liable for tipping outsiders, while those whom they have tipped are not liable 
for their subsequent trading on such information.152  A prohibition on trading by insiders 
is arguably less meaningful if insiders can tip outsiders with impunity.  Most countries 
that prohibit insider trading also prohibit insiders’ tipping of outsiders.153
A tippee is a third person (a corporate outsider) who has been tipped about 
material, non-public information by an insider (a director, manager, employee, etc.).  The 
second element, Tippee, equals one if tippees, like corporate insiders, are forbidden to 
trade on price-sensitive, private information, and zero otherwise.154   
                                                                                                                                                 
the person engaging in insider trading is virtually unique to common law countries, and particularly the 
United States.  See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).  Finally, for simplicity, neither do I 
code the misappropriation theory of liability.  See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  In 
contrast, one scholar does code misappropriation liability in the insider trading law measure that he 
constructs.  Duncan Herrington, Insider Trading Enforcement and Market Performance, Harvard Law 
School Working Paper (on file with the author) (2004). 
149  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (Foundation Press 1999); Brudney, 
supra note [ ]; ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (Little Brown 1986), Reinier Kraakman, The Legal 
Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING, 47, 50 (K. Hopt 
& E. Wymeersch, eds. 1991); WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (Aspen 
Publishers 1997); WILLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (Aspen Publishers 
1968). My sources of information about countries’ insider trading laws are Insider Trading: The Laws of 
Europe, the United States, and Japan (Emmanuel Gaillard, ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1992) and International Insider Dealing (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh, eds., FT Law & Tax, 1996). 
150  A tippee is an outsider who has received a “heads-up” (or tip) about price-sensitive, private 
information by a corporate insider (a director, manager, employee, advisor, etc.).   
151  As Professor Brudney notes, “the insider, by giving the information out selectively, is in effect selling 
the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself, 
including possibly prestige or status or the like.”  Brudney, supra note [ ], at 348. 
152  See Table1 infra. 
153  See Table1 infra. 
154  “[R]eceipt of the information by one who is such a selected beneficiary taints the recipient so that he 
should no more be entitled to use it in trading than was the donor.”  Brudney, supra note [ ], at 348. 
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 The third element, Damages, equals one if the potential monetary penalty for 
violating a country’s insider trading law is greater than the illicit insider trading profits, 
and zero otherwise.  If the potential monetary penalty is less than the expected profits 
from insider trading, the insider trading law’s deterrent effect is weaker, holding constant 
the probability of detection.155   
 The fourth and final element, Criminal, equals one if insider trading is a criminal 
offense in the country, and zero otherwise.  In some cases, criminal sanctions might yield 
more efficient deterrence than monetary sanctions.156  One case is where the likelihood of 
detection is very low and the optimal monetary penalty is thus greater than the violator’s 
net wealth.  In such a case, criminal prosecution leading to imprisonment or other non-
monetary sanctions might yield optimal deterrence.157  Criminal sanctions might also 
have the opposite effect, however, since in most jurisdictions criminal prosecution 
requires a higher standard of proof.  A higher burden of proof reduces the probability of 
success of prosecution and increases enforcement costs.  This should make finding a 
statistically significant coefficient on Criminal unlikely.  The preceding analysis is true 
only if criminal sanctions displace civil sanctions.  However, if criminal sanctions are 
imposed in conjunction with civil sanctions, unless they are never used, they should have 
a deterrent effect, if only because the cost of defending a criminal prosecution is a 
sanction whether or not the crime is proved.  Insider trading is both a criminal and a civil 
offense in several jurisdictions. 
 A country’s insider trading prohibition can be characterized along two broad 
(although not exhaustive) dimensions: the scope of the activities that it prohibits and the 
                                                 
155  Of course, the probability of detection is not constant; some countries have better detection technology 
than others.  When the probability of detection is very low, the monetary penalty must be greater than the 
insider’s expected gain to yield the efficient level of deterrence.  Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of 
Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency 
Problem, supra note [ ], 93-94.  See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic 
Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000) (modeling mechanisms for efficient 
public enforcement of laws).  In fact, very high monetary sanctions might be desirable if they accommodate 
low detection probabilities and thus economize on enforcement costs.  Id. 
156  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note [ ].  One case is where the likelihood of detection is very low and the 
optimal monetary penalty is thus greater than the violator’s net wealth.  In such a case, criminal prosecution 
leading to imprisonment or other non-monetary sanctions might yield optimal deterrence.  Easterbrook, 
supra note [ ].  Criminal sanctions might also have the opposite effect, however, since in most jurisdictions 
criminal prosecution requires a higher standard of proof.  A higher burden of proof reduces the probability 
of success of prosecution and increases enforcement costs.  This should make finding a statistically 
significant coefficient on Criminal unlikely. 
157  Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, supra note [ ], at 94. 
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 sanctions for violating it.  I thus create two sub-indices of insider trading law, which 
correspond roughly to these separate aspects.  The first sub-index, Scope, is the sum of 
Tipping and Tippee.  The insider trading prohibition is broader if it prohibits insiders both 
from trading and from tipping third parties.  It is broader still if it also forbids tippees to 
trade.  The second sub-index, Sanction, is the sum of Damages and Criminal and is a 
rough proxy for the expected cost of violating a country’s insider trading laws.  Potential 
violators are assumed to compare the expected benefits to the expected costs of breaking 
the law, a reasonable assumption, particularly when the motivation for the crime is 
financial gain.158  Holding constant the expected benefit, the greater the expected cost, 
the greater is the law’s deterrent effect.  Since I do not have data on the expected benefits 
of violating insider trading laws, my analysis implicitly assumes that they are constant 
within and across countries.  This assumption is less reasonable than the deterrence 
assumption because the incidence of and profits from insider trading may vary 
systematically with legal and institutional differences across the countries and contexts 
within which such trading occurs.159  It is expected, though not guaranteed, that the 
failure of this assumption will add noise to the analysis rather than systematically bias it. 
I also create an aggregate insider trading law index, IT Law, which is the sum of 
the two sub-indices, Scope and Sanction.  Abstracting from enforcement, an IT Law score 
of zero represents the most lax insider trading regime, while an IT Law score of four 
represents the most prohibitive insider trading regime.  Table 1 describes of the insider 
trading law variables in detail.  
b. Enforcement Environment 
In addition to the potential criminal or monetary sanctions for violating insider 
trading laws, their deterrent effect also depends on the probability (actual or perceived) 
that they will be enforced.160  In this regard, two dimensions of enforcement are relevant: 
                                                 
158  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169 (1968); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note [ ]. 
159  See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 11 European Financial Management 267 
(2005) (measuring the profitability of insider trading across countries); Abraham Ackerman & Ernst Maug, 
Insider Trading Legislation and Acquisition Announcements: Do Laws Matter? (2005) (unpublished 
working paper, on file with the author) (also measuring the profitability of insider trading across countries). 
160  See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL (University of Chicago Press 1973). 
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 actual (or past) enforcement and enforcement power (or potential), both of which 
potential violators should consider in deciding whether to risk violating the law.   
Although there is little systematic information on actual enforcement or 
enforcement power across countries, a few rough proxies exist.  For actual enforcement, I 
use information on countries’ enforcement histories from Bhattacharya and Daouk.161  
Their enforcement information consists of the year in which a country enforced its insider 
trading rules for the first time.  I convert this information into the variable Enforced by 
1994, which equals one if a country had enforced its insider trading rules for the first time 
by 1994 and zero otherwise.  I choose 1994 as the cut-off date because the dependent 
variables (ownership dispersion, stock price synchronicity, and stock market turnover) 
come from the mid-1990s and because the insider trading law indices are based on the 
sample countries’ insider trading rules as they existed around that time.162   
For enforcement power, I construct two separate measures: public enforcement 
power and private enforcement power.  My division of enforcement power into public 
and private dimensions is inspired by the theoretical inquiry about who should enforce a 
particular public law.163  To construct public enforcement power, I rely on securities 
regulatory information compiled by Professors La Porta et al. based on a survey of 
domestic lawyers concerning, among other things, the attributes and investigative powers 
of the securities market supervisor.164  The supervisor’s attributes include four elements 
                                                 
161  Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ]. 
162  Both the content and the enforcement of these laws might have changed in many of these countries 
since 1994.  See Herrington, supra note [ ], for more recent measures of insider trading rules and 
enforcement across countries. 
163  See, e.g., Edward Glaeser et al., Coase versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853 (2001); Jonathan R. 
Hay & Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. 
ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 398 (1998); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (YALE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 1938); La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]; and Shavell & Polinsky, supra note [ ].  La Porta 
et al. address the relative advantages and disadvantages of private and public enforcement of securities 
laws.  Under their public enforcement hypothesis, “[p]ublic enforcement might work because the enforcer 
is independent and focused and thus can regulate markets free from political interference, because the 
enforcer can introduce regulations of market participants, because it can secure information from issuers 
and market participants – through subpoena, discovery, or other means – more effectively than private 
plaintiffs, or because it can impose sanctions.”  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ], at 3.  Under 
their private enforcement hypothesis, the main advantage of securities laws is to reduce the costs of private 
contracting by mandating disclosure and delineating standards of liability for issuers and intermediaries.” 
Id. at 2.     
164  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ].  I am implicitly assuming that the sample countries’ 
relative rankings in terms of these measures have not changed significantly between the mid-1990s and the 
time when La Porta et al.’s conducted their survey, which was around 2002-2003. 
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 that address the supervisor’s independence, focus and power: (1) supervisor appointment 
process; (2) supervisor tenure; (3) focus of supervisor’s activities; and (4) supervisor’s 
rulemaking authority.  Professors La Porta et al. compute the supervisor characteristics 
index as the mean of these four attributes.165  A higher mean signifies that the securities 
market supervisor is more independent of the political process and has greater authority.  
Professors La Porta et al. also construct an index of the supervisor’s investigative powers, 
which equals the mean of the supervisor’s power to command documents and to 
subpoena the testimony of witnesses during investigations of violations of the country’s 
securities laws.166  Using these two measures, I create the variable Public Enforcement 
Power as the mean of Professors La Porta et al.’s supervisor characteristics and 
investigative powers indices.167  Table 1 describes Public Enforcement Power and its 
components in greater detail.   
 To construct a measure of private enforcement power, I first consider whether 
(“injured”168) investors may bring private suits against alleged transgressors of the 
country’s insider trading laws.  A private right of action gives particular investors 
(usually those who traded contemporaneously with the insider) or the corporation access 
to the courts to sue insiders for trading on inside information.  For example, some 
jurisdictions give individual investors the right to sue for monetary compensation for 
their alleged trading losses due to their having traded at the opposite end of an insider 
transaction.  Private rights to sue might increase investors’ incentives to enforce the 
country’s insider trading laws independent of any action taken by the relevant regulatory 
authority(ies).169  Therefore, holding constant the reliability and efficiency of the court 
                                                 
165  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]. 
166  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]. 
167  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]. 
168  There is some theoretical debate about whether individual investors are “harmed” by insider trading in 
public stock markets.  Some scholars argue that it is practically impossible to identify individuals or groups 
harmed by insider trading, since any cost of trading against better informed insiders is distributed across all 
investors.  See, e.g., William Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 Catholic University 
Law Review 863 (1987); William Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock 
Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5? 54 Southern California Law 
Review 1217 (1981).  At any rate, in the United States, “it has long been clear that persons who traded 
contemporaneously with an inside trader have a private right of action.”  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 123 (Foundation Press 1999). 
169  Of course, private enforcement might be abusive or insufficient.  See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000).  Nevertheless, 
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 system, the availability of a private right of action might render the law more effective by 
giving private parties an incentive to enforce it.  The variable Private Right equals one if 
such a right exists, and zero otherwise.  Private litigation is meaningful only to the extent 
that the judicial system is reliable and efficient, however.170  Thus, I construct an index of 
private enforcement power, Private Enforcement Power, as the product of an index of the 
efficiency of the judiciary171 and Private Right.  As Professor Merritt Fox notes, 
however, “countries that have a private right of action to support rules against insider 
trading probably have a quite different kind of legal system in other broader regards.”172  
I address this issue by controlling for the legal system in the regressions in Part IV.  Table 
1 describes Private Enforcement Power and its components in greater detail. 
3. Additional Economic, Legal and Institutional Variables 
To isolate the relationship between insider trading regulation and the dependent 
variables, in the regression analyses below, I control for several additional factors that 
prior research suggests are also relevant to financial market structure and performance.  
First, since economic development is generally associated with greater financial market 
development and better institutions and law enforcement capabilities,173 I control for the 
logarithm of per capita gross domestic product (GDP).174  Second, since stock market 
liquidity is positively associated with economic growth,175 I control for the growth of 
GDP per capita.  Third, I control for anti-director rights,176 and legal origin,177 since La 
Porta et al. demonstrate that these measures of the quality of investor legal protections 
                                                                                                                                                 
this does not change the analysis.  It merely goes to the issue of the optimal level of regulation, which is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
170  See, e.g., Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, & Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. the Coasians, 116 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 853 (2001); Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public 
Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 398 (1998). 
171  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]. 
172  Private conversation with Professor Merritt Fox. 
173  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, The Quality 
of Governement, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999); DOUGLAS NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY (Norton 1981). 
174  Also, wealthier countries should have (access to) more advanced surveillance technologies to detect 
insider trading violations.  
175  See Raymond Atje & Boyan Jovanovic, Stock Markets and Development, 37 EUR. ECON. REV. 632 
(1993); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 
(1998). 
176  Djankov et al., Self-Dealing, supra note [ ]. 
177  La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]. 
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 have an important bearing upon financial development.178 In particular, they find that 
countries with common law legal origins tend to have greater legal protections for 
investors and that both factors – common law legal origin and greater anti-director rights 
– are positively associated with stock market development. 
Finally, I control for disclosure, since better disclosure is associated with greater 
stock market development.179   In addition, timelier and higher quality information 
disclosure should reduce insiders’ opportunity to trade profitably relative to the rest of the 
market, thereby reducing their incentive to violate the law.180  I use two measures of 
disclosure quality.  The first is a measure of legal disclosure requirements from La Porta 
et al.181  This index, Disclosure, is an arithmetic average of 5 categories of information 
that firms are required to include in their offering prospectuses: (1) compensation; (2) 
ownership structure; (3) inside ownership; (4) irregular contracts; and (5) related party 
transactions.  The second measure is the quality of accounting standards, Accounting, 
which ranks countries on the basis of the quality of their corporate disclosure practices as 
of 1990.182  Disclosure is a rough proxy for the strength of the involuntary disclosure 
regime at the initial offering stage, while Accounting is a rough proxy for the quality of 
periodic (post-offering) disclosure and measures firms’ actual disclosure practices rather 
than legal disclosure requirements per se.183   
                                                 
178  La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]; 
Djankov et al., Djankov et al., Self-Dealing, supra note [ ]. 
179  See Jere R. Francis, Inder Khurana, & Raynolde Pereira, The Role of Accounting and Auditing in 
Corporate Governance and the Development of Financial Markets Around the World, 10 ASIA-PAC J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 1 (2004); La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]. 
180  Academics and lawmakers have long noted the close relationship between disclosure rules and insider 
trading laws.  Indeed, an important pillar of U.S. insider trading legislation is the “disclose or abstain” rule, 
which requires that insiders either disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading on the 
basis of such information.  See generally Maug, Insider Trading Legislation, supra note [ ], at 1581; Jesse 
M. Fried, Towards Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading, 71 Southern California Law 
Review 303 (1997) (arguing that a rule that would require insiders to disclose their identities and intentions 
to trade prior to trading would reduce considerably, and perhaps even eliminate, insider trading profits); 
Stanley Baiman & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Relation Among Capital Markets, Financial Disclosure, 
Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading, 343 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (1996) (showing that greater voluntary 
disclosure reduces the extent of insider trading in a firm’s shares); Shin, supra note [](demonstrating that 
some restriction of insider trading combined with minimal disclosure requirements is the optimal approach 
to regulating insider trading).   
181   La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]. 
182   La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]. 
183   In the regressions below, I report results using only Disclosure.  The results do not differ if I use 
Accounting rather than Disclosure. 
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 Table 1 describes all of the control variables in detail. 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the insider trading laws and enforcement measures for the 
sample countries, according to their legal origins: English common law or European civil 
law.184  Table 2 also presents the average of each insider trading law and enforcement 
measure for each of the four legal origin groups and for all of civil law countries and all 
of the common law countries.  I present the insider trading variables for the sample 
countries by their legal origins because previous research shows that corporate and 
securities laws differ significantly among countries according to their legal origins.185  In 
particular, common law countries tend to have stronger investor protection laws, 
especially rules prohibiting self-dealing by corporate insiders.186  To gauge whether this is 
also true for insider trading laws and enforcement, Table 2 computes t-test statistics that 
indicate whether the average values of the insider trading law and enforcement measures 
differ significantly between the civil and common law countries in the sample. 
As Table 2 shows, for the full sample, the overall average of the aggregate insider 
trading law index, IT Law, is 2.73.  The average value of IT Law is 2.91 for the common 
law countries and 2.64 for the common law countries, but this result is not statistically 
significant.    Looking at the components of this index, we see that the average scope of 
insider trading bans (Scope) is almost identical for the two groups of countries, but there 
is a small difference in mean sanction threat (common law Sanction = 1.18, while civil 
law Sanction = 0.86), which is significant at the 10% level.  In other words, the common 
law countries are somewhat more likely to be able to impose criminal sanctions and 
multiple monetary penalties upon those who violate the country’s insider trading laws 
than are the civil law countries, suggesting somewhat greater deterrence in common law 
countries.  This difference is, however, attributable to the fact that four civil law countries 
                                                 
184  The average year of enactment for the countries in the sample is 1983, which suggests that insider 
trading regulation is a relatively recent phenomenon.  In fact, the majority of the countries in the sample did 
not have an insider trading law prior to 1988.  The United States was the first country in the world to 
prohibit insider trading, with an effective prohibition occurring in 1961.  The next country to prohibit 
insider trading was Canada, which enacted its insider trading law in 1966.  The average year of the first 
enforcement is 1989, roughly 6 years after the average year of enactment.   
185  La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]; La 
Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ]; Djankov et al., Self-Dealing, supra note [ ]. 
186  Id. 
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 and no common law countries have insider trading laws with none of our measured 
sanctions.  The large majority of the civil law countries have sanction threats like those of 
the common law countries.  Thus, it would be a mistake to conclude that civil law origin 
necessarily implies that the sanctions attaching to insider trading laws will be weaker 
than those in common law countries.  There is a similarly small, and in this case 
statistically insignificant, difference in the fractions of civil and common law countries 
that had enforced their insider trading laws by 1994.   
Turning to enforcement power, a different picture emerges.  The average value of 
Public (or Regulatory) Enforcement Power is 0.69 for the common law countries and 
0.41 for the civil law countries, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The average value of Private (Investor) Enforcement Power is 5.73 for the common law 
countries and 2.91 for the civil law countries, which is also significant at the 1% level.  
Thus, despite substantial similarity in the formal dimensions of insider trading laws, we 
find, consistent with the work of La Porta et al., that investors in common law countries 
can expect somewhat greater protection against insider trading (and other securities law 
violations) than investors in civil law countries.187  
Table 3 reports the averages, medians and standard deviations of the variables that 
will be used in our analyses, both overall and by common law and civil law origin.  
Interestingly, the average values of the three dependent variables, ownership dispersion, 
stock price synchronicity, and average stock market turnover do not differ significantly 
between the common law and civil law countries of the sample.  There is similarly no 
difference between common law and civil law countries on our two measures of 
economic well-being (average wealth and average economic growth).  However, the 
other three control variables, anti-director rights, disclosure rules, and accounting 
standards do tend to be more stringent for the common law countries in my sample than 
for the civil law countries.188
                                                 
187  La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]. 
188  The similarity on the dependent variables between common law and civil law countries is not what the 
work of La Porta et al. would lead one to expect.  The significant difference on the three control variables is 
consistent with their results.  La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, supra note [ ]. 
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 Table 4 presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients among the variables that 
are relevant to an empirical assessment of Hypotheses 1-3 (H1-H3); i.e., the dependent 
variables, outside ownership, stock price synchronicity, and average stock market 
turnover, and the insider trading law and enforcement measures.  H1 predicts that 
countries with more restrictive insider trading laws have greater ownership dispersion, 
other things equal.  Consistent with H1, Table 4 indicates that ownership dispersion is 
positively and significantly correlated with the aggregate IT Law index, the sub-index 
Sanction, and Enforced by 1994.  The correlation coefficients range between 0.44 for IT 
Law and 0.53 for Sanction.  These correlations are not huge, but neither are they tiny.  In 
contrast, ownership dispersion is not significantly correlated with the Scope sub-
component of IT Law or with either of the enforcement power variables, Public 
Enforcement Power or Private Enforcement Power.  The three insignificant coefficients 
are, however, of the predicted (positive) sign.  Figure 1 presents average ownership 
concentration graphed against IT Law and indicates that average ownership concentration 
steadily declines as IT Law increases, consistent with H1. 
H2 predicts that stock prices are more informative, in that they contain a higher 
degree of firm-specific information, when insider trading laws are more stringent.  The 
implication is that stock prices should be less synchronous (i.e., move together to a lesser 
extent) in countries with stricter insider trading laws and enforcement.  Thus a negative 
correlation between stock price synchronicity and the various insider trading law and 
enforcement measures is expected.189  Consistent with H2, Table 4 shows that stock price 
synchronicity is negatively and significantly correlated with the aggregate IT Law index 
and with its sub-indices Sanction and Scope.  However, stock price synchronicity is not 
significantly correlated with any of the enforcement measures, Enforced by 1994, Public 
Enforcement Power or Private Enforcement Power, although these coefficients are all of 
the expected (negative) sign.  Figure 2 plots average stock price synchronicity against IT 
Law and shows, consistent with H2, albeit weakly, that average stock price synchronicity 
is higher in countries with lower IT Law values. 
                                                 
189  H2 predicts a negative correlation between the stringency of insider trading laws and synchronicity 
because lower synchronicity implies that stock prices are more informative. 
 
 
454
45
Beny:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
 Finally, H3 predicts that stock markets are more liquid in countries that have 
more restrictive insider trading laws.  In Table 4, we see that average stock market 
turnover, a proxy for stock market liquidity, is positively and significantly correlated with 
the sub-index Scope.  However, average stock market turnover is not significantly 
correlated with Sanction, the aggregate IT Law index, or with any of the three 
enforcement measures, Enforced by 1994, Public Enforcement Power and Private 
Enforcement Power.  Moreover, the correlations between the latter two enforcement 
variables and average stock market turnover are, contrary to H3, negative.  Figure 3 plots 
average stock market turnover against IT Law and shows that average stock market 
turnover is greater in countries with higher IT Law values, consistent with H3. 
Table 4 also reveals other relationships of interest, although they are not 
directly relevant to H1-H3.  In particular, it appears that countries whose formal 
insider trading laws penalize insider trading more harshly, in the form of criminal 
or monetary penalties, tend to allocate greater enforcement powers to both public 
and private enforcers and are more likely to have actually enforced their insider 
trading laws by 1994.   The correlation coefficients between IT Law and Enforced 
by 1994, Public Enforcement Power and Private Enforcement Power, 
respectively, are positive and significant at the 10% or above.  Likewise, the 
correlation coefficients between the IT Law sub-index Sanction and Enforced by 
1994, Public Enforcement Power and Private Enforcement Power, respectively, 
are positive and significant at the 10% or above.  Furthermore, countries that 
allocate greater public enforcement power also tend to have greater private 
enforcement potential.  The correlation coefficient between Public Enforcement 
Power and Private Enforcement Power is 0.33 and is significant at the 10% level 
in Table 4.  
Finally, although Table 4 does not report correlations between the level of 
economic development and the various dependent variables and insider trading law and 
enforcement measures, they are noteworthy.  The wealthier economies (where wealth is 
measured by the log of GDP per capita) in the sample have significantly larger stock 
markets (as measured by stock market capitalization).  The wealthier countries also have 
more diffuse equity ownership; the correlation between the log of GDP per capita and 
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 outside ownership is 0.35 and is significant at the 5% level.  In addition, the correlation 
coefficient between stock price synchronicity and the log of GNP is -0.44 and is 
significant at the 1% level, which means that stock prices tend to reflect more firm-
specific information in wealthier countries.  In contrast, the wealthier countries in the 
sample do not have significantly more liquid stock markets.  Finally, the richer countries 
have significantly more stringent insider trading laws by all three measures (Scope, 
Sanction, and IT Law) and are more likely to have enforced those laws by 1994.190  For 
these reasons, we cannot consider H1-H3 supported without conducting a more 
controlled analysis, and in the regressions below I control for wealth (log of GDP per 
capita) and various additional variables. 
IV. Regression Analysis of Insider Trading Law and the Stock Market 
 Although the empirical results presented in Part III.B are generally consistent with 
the predictions of H1-H3, those results present only a partial story, for they do not 
control for factors, other than the insider trading laws, which might explain the dependent 
variables.  It may be, for example, that if we looked at two countries with identical wealth 
and accounting rules the relationships between more stringent insider trading bans and 
stock market characteristics would disappear (i.e., become statistically insignificant) or 
even reverse (i.e., be significant but in the opposite direction of the Table 4 results).   
Multivariable regression analysis is a way of controlling for this possibility.191
 The multivariable regression model we shall use is 
eXBXBBY MMNN +++= 0  
where Y is the dependent variable of interest, the XN  are our various independent 
variables (i.e., measures of insider trading laws and their enforcement) and the XM are our 
various control variables.  In the regressions below, I consider a coefficient to be 
statistically significant if it is at least significant at the 10% level.   
                                                 
190  However, public and private enforcement measures are not greater for the wealthier countries and, in 
fact, Public Enforcement Power is, paradoxically, negatively correlated with the log of GDP per capita at 
the 5% level of significance.   
191  Multiple regression is by now so familiar in the law review literature that I shall not bother to explain 
it.  The reader who wants to learn more about this statistical technique may wish to consult Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 2nd ed., 
Federal Judicial Center (2000), pp. 179-22 
http://air.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf (last visited July 18, 2006) 
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 A. Insider Trading Law and Corporate Ownership  
H1 predicts that countries with more stringent insider trading laws have more 
dispersed equity ownership.  Due to limited data availability on corporate ownership 
patterns across countries, I test this hypothesis using the degree of ownership dispersion 
in a country’s ten largest non-financial firms as the dependent variable in several 
different multivariable regression models.  The independent variables in these regressions 
are measures of insider trading laws and enforcement.  The insider trading law variables, 
Scope and Sanction, are centered about their means to address multicollinearity. I also 
include an interaction term, Scope*Sanction, which is the product of (mean-centered) 
Scope and (mean-centered) Sanction.  The control variables include disclosure quality, 
legal origin, an index of anti-director rights, the log of GDP per capita, and the growth of 
GDP per capita.   
Table 5 reports three regression models for ownership dispersion.  In model 1, the 
coefficient on Scope is positive, which is consistent with H1, but it is not statistically 
significant.  Thus, we cannot conclude on the basis of Model 1 that the scope of the 
insider trading prohibition is associated with wider ownership dispersion.  In contrast, in 
Model 1, the coefficient on Sanction is 0.15 and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and of the predicted sign, suggesting that stiffer sanctions for insider trading are 
associated with less concentrated equity ownership, at least in a country’s ten largest non-
financial firms.  In Model 1, the coefficients on the control variables are all 
insignificant.192   
Model 1 looks only at the law on the books.  If the law has not been enforced or 
has been enforced only recently, regardless of what the law stipulates, it may have had 
                                                 
192  In regressions that I do not report in the article, I regress ownership dispersion on the alternative 
disclosure measures and the control variables, excluding the insider trading law indices.  The coefficient on 
Disclosure is positive and significant at the 5% level.  This result is consistent with what La Porta et al. 
find.  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note [ ].  In contrast, the coefficient on Accounting is positive, 
although it is insignificant.  The finding of this article that the relationship between insider trading laws and 
the dependent variables is generally stronger than the relationship between the dependent variables and 
disclosure is consistent with the finding of another empirical study that disclosure is of secondary 
importance to the legal rules protecting investors.  Francis et al., supra note [ ].  But see La Porta et al., 
What Works?, supra note [ ] and Djankov et al., Self-Dealing, supra note [ ] (both articles finding that 
disclosure rules are positively associated with stock market development across countries) 
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 little influence on behavior.193  Ideally, we would be able to measure the activities of the 
agencies charged with enforcing insider trading laws, but I was unable to acquire such 
measures for all the countries in my sample.  The only measure currently available is the 
relatively crude measure of whether a country’s insider trading law is a mere formality, 
as indexed by whether the law was ever enforced by 1994.  Thus Model 2 adds the 
variable, Enforced by 1994 (described above) to the control variables of Model 1. 
We see from Model 2 in Table 5 that a history of enforcement has effects 
consistent with H1, for the coefficient on Enforced by 1994 is positive, as predicted, and 
significant.  Including this variable in the ownership dispersion regression does not 
dampen the effect of the Sanction measure of insider trading law.  Rather, the magnitude 
and significance of the coefficient on Sanction is the same in Models 1 and 2.  Moreover, 
Model 2 explains a greater proportion of the variance of ownership dispersion among 
large firms than Model 1 explains (R2 increases from 58% to 65% between Model 1 and 
Model 2). 
Finally, Model 3 adds controls for two potential enforcement measures, Public 
Enforcement Power and Private Enforcement Power.194  These variables have somewhat 
different meanings.  Public Enforcement Power relates to the independence and authority 
of the stock market supervisory official(s) and is not limited to the authority to proceed 
against insider trading violations.  Hence it may be seen as an indicator of the general 
regulatory climate regarding financial markets.  The Private Enforcement Power variable 
                                                 
193   In discussing the limitations of the laws on the books as predictors of financial market development in 
transition economies, Professors Gelfer, Pistor, and Raiser stress that: “For the law on the books to affect 
financial market development…law enforcement must be credible.  Past experience with legal reforms 
suggests that where new laws were forced upon a judicial system unfamiliar with the underlying legal 
tradition and were not adapted to fit the specific local context, the effectiveness of the law suffered….Trust 
in the law remained low and reliable enforcement by the state’s legal institutions could not be 
guaranteed….the quality of law enforcement is at least of equal importance to the extensiveness of the 
law.”  Stanislaw Gelfer, Katharina Pistor, & Martin Raiser, Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 
Economics of Transition 325, 328 (2000) (emphasis added).  In their empirical investigation, Gelfer et al. 
find that the effectiveness of legal institutions is more important to the development of financial markets in 
transition economies than the formal written laws.  Id. at 351-355.  Thus, it is necessary to consider not 
only countries’ formal written laws but also the characteristics of the institutional environment that pertain 
to the credibility of such laws.  In the present context, the relevant inquiry is twofold: (1) whether a country 
has an established history of enforcing its insider law and (2) insider trading enforcement history aside, the 
quality of the available mechanisms for enforcement of the country’s insider trading and securities laws. 
194 As a brief reminder, recall that Public Enforcement Power is the arithmetic mean of an index of 
the securities market supervisor’s characteristics and an index of the securities market supervisor’s 
investigative powers and Private Enforcement Power is the product of the existence of a private right of 
action pursuant to a country’s insider trading law and the efficiency of the judiciary.  See Table 1 infra. 
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 reflects the capacity of private parties to seek redress for violations of insider trading laws 
– hence it can be seen both as an aspect of the stringency of the insider trading regulatory 
regime and as a more general indicator of the seriousness with which insider trading 
violations are taken by the country’s law makers.  We see from Model 3 in Table 5 that 
controlling for Private Enforcement Power and Public Enforcement Power does not 
fundamentally change the results of Models 1 and 2.  However, Model 3 does slightly 
increase the proportion of variance explained relative to Model 2.  The results in Table 5 
are robust to dropping one country at a time from each regression; that is, no single 
country drives the results. 
To summarize, the regressions in Table 5 suggest that outside ownership in a 
country’s largest non-financial firms is positively related to the existence of criminal or 
monetary sanctions for violating the country’s insider trading laws, other things equal.  If 
such a relationship exists, it is not trivial.  For instance, Model 3 suggests that a 0.32 
point increase in the Sanction score is associated with about a 5 percentage point increase 
in average ownership dispersion.195  This 5 percentage point increase is approximately 
the difference in average ownership concentration between common law (59%) and civil 
law countries (54%) and about 9% of the average ownership dispersion for the sample.  
This finding is consistent with H1 and suggests that a country’s largest public 
corporations tend to have greater ownership dispersion where insider trading laws are 
enforceable through civil, criminal, or civil and criminal sanctions and, conversely, it 
appears that ownership concentration is greater in countries whose insider trading laws 
include weaker sanctions for insider trading violations.   
B. Insider Trading Law and Stock Price Informativeness  
H2 predicts that stock prices are more informative in countries that have more 
stringent insider trading laws.  Lower synchronicity implies more informative stock 
prices for reasons explained above.  Thus, H2 predicts negative coefficients on the 
insider trading law variables in regressions where stock price synchronicity is the 
dependent variable.  Table 6 reports three regressions that test this hypothesis.  Models 1 
                                                 
195  0.32 is the difference in the average value of Sanction between the common law and civil law countries 
in my sample. 
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 through 3 in Table 6 include the same independent and control variables as the three 
corresponding regressions for ownership dispersion reported in Table 5. 
As with ownership dispersion, Model 1 of Table 6 shows that the coefficients on 
Scope and the interaction term, Scope*Sanction, are statistically insignificant, although 
they are negative as predicted by H2.  Model 1 also shows that the coefficient on 
Sanction is negative (-5.39) and it is significant at the 1% level.  This result is consistent 
with H2 and suggests that more stringent insider trading laws are associated with more 
informative (i.e., less synchronous) stock prices.  The availability of civil, criminal, or 
criminal and civil sanctions again appears to be driving the relationship.  That is, stock 
prices appear to be more informative about firm-specific developments in the sample 
countries in which those who violate the country’s insider trading laws face greater 
potential criminal and monetary sanctions.  Models 2 and 3 in Table 6 control for various 
aspects of the enforcement environment that might be driving this result, since Sanction 
is positively and significantly correlated with the enforcement variables (as demonstrated 
in Table 4). 
Model 2 adds the control variable Enforced by 1994 to the regressors in Model 1.  
The coefficient on Enforced by 1994 is insignificant but it is in the direction (negative) 
predicted by H2.  Importantly, controlling for enforcement history does not dampen the 
relationship between the Sanction index and stock price synchronicity relative to Model 
1.  Rather, the coefficient on Sanction increases in absolute magnitude and it remains 
significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient on Model 2 also explains a greater proportion 
of the variance in stock price synchronicity relative to Model 1. 
Model 3 adds to Model 2 the two additional enforcement measures, Public 
Enforcement Power and Private Enforcement Power.196  Model 3, reported in Table 6, 
indicates that the coefficient on Public Enforcement Power is negative and significant at 
the 1% level.  This result implies that countries whose securities regulatory authorities 
have greater enforcement power have more informative stock prices, other things equal.  
Model 3 also shows that controlling for Private Enforcement Power and Public 
Enforcement Power does not change the basic results relative to Models 1 and 2.  
Although the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on Sanction falls somewhat in Model 
                                                 
196 See infra for an explanation of the meaning of these enforcement measures.   
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 3, it is still significant at the 1% level as in Models 1 and 2.  Also, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, Scope*Sanction, becomes significant at the 10% level in model 3.  In 
addition, Model 3 does not change the magnitude or significance of the coefficient on 
Enforced by 1994 relative to Model 2.  Finally, Model 3 increases the proportion of 
variance explained relative to Models 1 and 2.  The results in Table 6 are robust to 
dropping one country at a time from each regression; that is, no single country is driving 
the results. 
In summary, the regressions in Table 6 suggest that, other things equal, stock 
prices are less synchronous (presumably more informative) in countries with greater 
potential criminal or monetary sanctions for insider trading law violations.  To concretize 
this basic result, Model 3 in Table 6 suggests that a 0.32 point increase in the Sanction 
score is associated with roughly a 1.7 percentage point decrease in average stock price 
synchronicity, or slightly more than twice the difference in average stock price 
synchronicity between civil law countries (66.52%) and common law countries (65.76) 
and about 2.6% of average stock price synchronicity for the full sample (66.25%).  Also 
note that Models 1 – 3 suggest that stock prices are more synchronous (less informative) 
in civil law countries than in common law countries (the omitted dummy variable).197
C. Insider Trading Law and Stock Market Liquidity 
H3 predicts that stock markets are more liquid in countries that have more 
stringent insider trading laws for the reasons given above.  Thus, H3 predicts positive 
coefficients on the insider trading law variables in regressions where stock market 
turnover is the dependent variable.  Table 7 reports three regressions that test this 
hypothesis; the dependent variable is the log of the average stock market turnover 
between 1991 and 1995.  The regressions in Table 7 include the same independent and 
control variables as in Tables 5 and 6 for ownership dispersion and stock price 
synchronicity, respectively.  
In Model 1, the coefficient on Scope is positive as predicted by H3; however, it is 
only marginally significant at the 11% level.  The coefficient on Sanction in Model 1 is 
                                                 
197  In regressions that I do not report in the article, I regress stock price synchronicity on the alternative 
disclosure measures and the control variables, without the insider trading law indices.  The coefficient on 
Disclosure is positive but insignificant, while the coefficient on Accounting is positive and significant at the 
5% level.   
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 positive, consistent with H3, but it is statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the 
coefficient on the interaction between (mean-centered) Scope and (mean-centered) 
Sanction is positive and significant at the 1% level in Model 1.  This result is consistent 
with H3 and suggests that simultaneously broader and more punitive insider trading laws 
are associated with greater stock market liquidity.   
Model 2 in Table 7 supplements Model 1 by controlling for Enforced by 1994.  
The coefficient on Enforced by 1994 is insignificant, but it is positive as predicted by H3.  
Note that controlling for past enforcement in this manner does not affect the relationship 
between average stock market turnover and the interaction between (mean-centered) 
Scope and (mean-centered) Sanction.  In addition, Model 2 explains a greater proportion 
of the variance in average stock market turnover relative to Model 1.   
Model 3 adds the two potential enforcement measures, Public Enforcement Power 
and Private Enforcement Power to the control variables in Model 2.198  Neither of these 
variables is statistically significant in Model 3.  However, in Model 3 the coefficient on 
the interaction between (mean-centered) Scope and (mean-centered) Sanction increases in 
magnitude relative to both Models 1 and 2 and in statistical significance relative to 
Models 2.  In addition, Model 3 increases the proportion of variance explained relative to 
Models 1 and 2.199
To summarize, the results in Table 7 are consistent with H3, which posits that 
countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more liquid stock markets, 
other things equal.  However, the results in Table 7 are somewhat sensitive to the 
inclusion of particular countries in the regressions, so they must be interpreted with 
caution. 
D. Interaction of Sanctions and Public Enforcement Power 
There is sound reason to expect that both insider trading laws and public 
enforcement mechanisms affect investors’ expectations and hence stock market 
                                                 
198 See infra for an explanation of the meaning of these enforcement measures.   
199  In regressions that I do not report in the article, I regress stock market turnover on each the alternative 
disclosure quality measures and the other control variables, excluding the insider trading law variables.  
The coefficients on Disclosure and Accounting are both positive but insignificant.   
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 performance.200  However, in the regressions above, with the exception of ownership (see 
Model 3 in Table 5), the coefficients on these separate variables are never simultaneously 
significant.   A potential reason for this is multicollinearity between the insider trading 
law variables and Public Enforcement Power (see Table 4).  I thus pursue a common 
approach to multicollinearity, which is to combine collinear variables into a single 
variable in light of their inseparable influence on the dependent variable.  I create a new 
variable, Public Enforcement Power*Sanction, which is the product of Public 
Enforcement Power and Sanction.  I then run the regressions for each of the three 
dependent variables using this new variable, Public Enforcement Power*Sanction.   
The results for each of the three dependent variables are reported in Table 8.  
Columns 1 and 2 present the results for ownership dispersion, which are consistent with 
H1.  Columns 3 and 4 report the results for stock price synchronicity, which are 
consistent with H2.  Finally, columns 5 and 6 present the results for average stock market 
turnover and these results are consistent with H3.201  Regressions 1, 3 and 5 in Table 8 
are robust to dropping one country at a time; that is, no single country dominates the 
results in these regressions.   
E. Summary and Discussion of Results 
The regression analyses yield three basic results.  The first result is that a 
country’s large public corporations tend to have less concentrated ownership, where 
concentration is defined as the proportion of a company’s stock held by the company’s 
three largest shareholders, when a country has tougher insider trading laws and 
enforcement.  This finding is consistent with H1.  The availability of criminal or 
monetary sanctions for violating the insider trading laws and a willingness to enforce 
them seem particularly important.  Since concentrated ownership is a mechanism for 
addressing agency problems and because outside investors are reluctant to invest when 
                                                 
200 Ackerman and Maug note that “market participants anticipate future enforcement actions by regulatory 
authorities [and] this effect is concentrated in countries with high quality legal systems [where] investors 
change their behavior after insider trading laws have been enacted and…before they have been enforced 
[while i]n countries with less effective legal systems laws may have no impact as investors anticipate that 
they will not be enforced.” Ackerman and Maug, supra note, at 2-3. 
201 Regressions 2, 4, and 6 are not directly comparable to regressions 1, 3, and 5, respectively because they 
contain different independent variables.  However, I present them because they are directly comparable to 
the results in Tables 5 through 7 above.  In fact, they constitute a forth model for each of the dependent 
variables.  Note that the coefficients on Sanction*Public Enforcement Power are insignificant in each of 
these regressions.  This is probably due to multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
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 agency costs are high, this result supports theories that see insider trading an as agency 
cost.  However, the result is also consistent with the view that insider trading reduces 
agency costs, meaning that ownership concentration may be endogenous to insider 
trading.  Thus, the first set of models we examined (in Table 5) provide only a weak test 
of the implications of prohibitions against insider trading because our ownership 
dispersion measure is limited to ten companies per country and the results are 
indeterminate in any event.202  Nevertheless, the failure to find that more stringent insider 
trading laws are associated with greater ownership concentration is some evidence that 
prohibiting insider trading does not have one kind of detrimental effect that might occur 
if the laws were counterproductive.  Moreover, the ownership results suggest that 
countries that wish to encourage more widespread equity ownership might want to 
consider strengthening their insider trading laws. 
The results of the second set of regression models (Table 6) indicate that stock 
prices tend to be less synchronous (i.e., contain more firm-specific information) in 
countries with more stringent insider trading laws, consistent with H2.  This finding is 
consistent with the claim that insider trading undermines stock price accuracy because it 
discourages arbitrage traders by increasing the risk of expropriation and/or by stifling 
competition in the market for information, and/or it increases insiders’ incentives to 
manipulate information disclosure.  These results are not what one would expect if the 
claim of opponents of insider trading legislation that insider trading is an effective and 
less costly alternative to traditional disclosure were true. 
The results from the third set of models indicate that countries with tougher 
insider trading laws tend to have more liquid stock markets, consistent with H3.  Support 
                                                 
202 See Parts I and II infra for a review of the conflicting accounts of Professors Demsetz and Bhide, on the 
one hand, and Professor Maug, on the other hand, regarding the impact of insider trading on agency costs.  
In another study, I conduct a more direct test of the agency cost implications of insider trading laws by 
examining the relationship between insider trading laws at the country-level and corporate valuation at the 
firm level.  Beny, Do Shareholders Value?, supra note [ ].  In that study, I find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between corporate valuation and insider trading law and enforcement among firms 
in common law countries but not among firms in civil law countries.  Id.   Judge Easterbrook suggests a 
few additional tests of the agency implications of insider trading, including investigation of the empirical 
“relation between insiders’ trading and other forms of compensation”; “substitution between insider trading 
and other agency-cost control devices”; and various tests of the stock market’s reaction to changes in 
insider trading regulation or to firm-specific incidences of prosecution for insider trading violations.  
Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, supra note [ ], at 96-97.  However, Judge Easterbrook 
notes that “even with data the [agency question] may be insoluble.”  Id. at 97. 
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 for H3 is consistent with theoretical and empirical research in market microstructure that 
finds a detrimental effect of information asymmetry on trading costs and with the notion 
that allowing insiders to trade on information known only to them harms liquidity 
(increases transaction costs) by reducing competition among informed traders.  The 
results therefore support those who advocate insider trading regulation on the ground that 
it promotes liquid stock markets. 
All three basic results are robust to controlling for the enforcement environment.  
Furthermore, the regressions strongly suggest that the possibility of stringent criminal or 
monetary sanctions, rather than the breadth of the prohibition, is the more salient feature 
of countries’ insider trading laws.  Sanctions are more frequently significant than the 
scope of the insider trading prohibition in the regressions reported in this article. 
V. Conclusion and Implications for the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate 
This article began by summarizing the longstanding and unresolved theoretical 
law and economics debate about the efficiency implications of insider trading, reviewing 
some of the most prominent agency and market theories of insider trading on both sides 
of the debate.  Next, the article presented the equally perennial debate about whether 
insider trading ought to be regulated or left to private contracting.  The main contribution 
of this article, however, is that it moves the law and economics debate away from the 
purely theoretical to the empirical realm.  In doing so, it provides some evidence that 
seems favor proponents of insider trading regulation. Recent empirical studies of insider 
trading laws seem to point in the same direction. 203
                                                 
203  See e.g., Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ] (finding that stock market liquidity increases after the 
enactment of insider trading laws and the cost of equity falls significantly after a country prosecutes its 
insider trading law for the first time); Bushman et al., supra note [ ] (finding that analyst following 
increases after countries’ initial enforcement of insider trading laws, where analyst activity is assumed to be 
beneficial to stock market efficiency); Herrington, supra note [ ] (reporting results similar to the findings in 
this article, using more recent country data and insider trading laws).  For recent evidence that is less 
equivocal about the benefits of insider trading law and regulation, see Beny, Do Shareholders Value Insider 
Trading Laws?  International Evidence (August 2006) (unpublished working paper on file with the author; 
also available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=296111>) [hereinafter Beny, Do 
Shareholders Value?] (finding that more stringent insider trading laws are associated with greater corporate 
valuation in common law countries, but lower corporate valuation in civil law countries); Bris, supra note [ 
] (finding that insider trading profits prior to tender offer announcements decrease in the stringency of the 
law, but increase after the first enforcement); Durnev & Nain, supra note [ ](finding that insider trading 
laws may have perverse effects in civil law countries).  None of the recent evidence supports any firm 
policy prescription, however, since evidence about the costs of insider trading regulation and enforcement 
is not available yet.  See discussion infra at Part V. 
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 The results are consistent with (but do not prove) the claim that insider trading 
laws generate positive market externalities.  In particular, the findings that such laws are 
associated with more liquid stock markets and more informative stock prices support 
those who oppose private contracting on the ground that insider trading has external 
effects on the stock market.  More liquid stock markets and more accurate stock prices 
reduce the overall cost of equity capital204 and improve the efficiency of capital 
allocation205, respectively.  Private parties are unlikely to give adequate consideration to 
these external benefits in their private negotiations.  Thus, these two findings bolster the 
case for public regulation and correspondingly weaken the case for a “Coasian” approach 
to insider trading.206  Furthermore, to the extent that insider trading regulation encourages 
more accurate stock prices and greater stock market liquidity, regulation might indirectly 
ameliorate corporate agency problems, as more accurate stock prices and greater liquidity 
facilitate improved corporate governance and the market for corporate control.207  In 
contrast, less accurate prices and lower liquidity reduce shareholders’ incentives to 
monitor and hence increase corporate insiders’ ability and incentives to expropriate 
outside investors.208  Thus, enacting or strengthening insider trading laws and their 
enforcement is something that countries interested in increasing the viability of their 
stock markets might consider.209   
                                                 
204  Amihud &  Mendelson, supra note [ ].   
205  Wurgler, supra note [ ]. 
206  See Goshen et al., supra note [ ]; Cox, supra note [ ].  See generally Glaeser et al., supra note [ ]. 
207  The literature on mandatory securities disclosure enumerates several economic benefits of accurate 
stock prices, including their role in improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs.  See, e.g., 
Fox, supra note [ ].  In addition, using a mathematical model, Professor Maug shows that liquid stock 
markets are beneficial because they improve corporate governance by improving large shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor.  Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-off Between 
Liquidity and Control? 53 J. FIN. 65 (1998) [hereinafter Maug, Large Shareholders]. 
208 Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders, supra note [ ]; Fox, supra note [ ]. 
209 Even if strong insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater public participation in 
the stock market, more liquid stock markets, and more accurate stock prices, however, policymakers need 
to assess whether they are worth their costs.  Such costs include the cost of legislative enactment and 
subsequent market supervision and enforcement and various additional direct and indirect costs of the 
regulatory scheme.  See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:  
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business 
Working Paper 521, Harvard Law School (2005) (discussing the direct and indirect costs of financial 
regulation).  So far, there have been no empirical studies, much less comparative empirical studies, of the 
relative costs and benefits of insider trading regulation.  Id. at 32 (“we don’t have evidence that the benefits 
of enforcing insider trading law exceeds the costs of enforcing these laws”). 
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 It is premature, however to claim that such a strategy will surely succeed or that 
the debate between proponents and opponents of insider trading laws has now been 
empirically resolved.  The results of this study must be viewed cautiously for several 
reasons.  One is the crude nature of the available variables.  Ownership concentration 
ratios in a country’s midsize and smaller firms might, for example, be very different from 
what they are in a relatively small number of the country’s very largest firms.  And, we 
would like to know how regularly a country’s insider trading laws have been enforced 
and not merely whether they have been enforced once before 1994.210  Also, the sample 
of available countries is quite small and there may be differences between them in data 
reliability.  It is also possible that some countries enacted insider trading laws merely in 
response to external pressure,211 resulting in rote transplantation of foreign insider trading 
laws unrelated to such countries’ financial, legal, and institutional characteristics.212  It is 
some consolation that these concerns would ordinarily be expected to reduce the 
likelihood of finding significant relationships but they nonetheless caution against relying 
too heavily on these results.  An additional concern is that the relationship between 
insider trading laws/enforcement and measures of stock market performance might be 
context and culture dependent.  A relationship that holds across the sample as a whole 
may not hold for a particular country with its own business traditions at a particular stage 
of economic development. 
Finally, although this article’s empirical results demonstrate a significant 
relationship between insider trading laws and various measures of stock market 
performance, they do not prove causality.  More developed stock markets may simply 
have stronger insider trading laws and enforcement because they have the necessary 
influential constituencies to demand a tough approach to insider trading.  The public 
                                                 
210 Even if we knew the frequency of enforcement, there would be serious endogeneity problems because 
a country with the most effective insider trading regime might have occasion to engage in relatively low 
enforcement efforts.  Ideally we would be able to test a time series model.   
211  See Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note [ ]. 
212  See generally Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 
50 American Journal of Comparative Law 97-130 (2002).  This suggests that careful study of the political 
economy of countries’ (especially emerging markets’) adoption of insider trading laws is desirable.  For a 
start, see Beny, The Political Economy of Insider Trading Legislation and Enforcement:  International 
Evidence, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Working Paper 348, Harvard Law 
School.   In addition, I am conducting a survey of stock market regulators around the world about the 
motivating circumstances of their country’s adoption and initial enforcement of insider trading laws. 
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 choice claim that certain stakeholders in the financial system cause insider trading laws to 
be adopted suggests that causality might run from the financial system to insider trading 
laws, rather than the reverse.213
The appropriate conclusion to reach from this research is not that the arguments 
of proponents of insider trading regulation have been shown to be sounder than the 
arguments of those who criticize such regulation, but rather that there is somewhat more 
reason to believe in their soundness than there was before this study was conducted.  
There is also need for further empirical research into these issues, including the assembly 
of more adequate cross-sectional data sets.  This article is but a first step.  It will help 
resolve the theoretical conflict (and perhaps contribute to the articulation o a more 
coherent insider trading doctrine in the United States) only if other empirical work 
follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
                                                 
213  See, e.g.,Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note [ ] (arguing that insider trading 
laws are adopted for political reasons, not necessarily to improve efficiency).  See also Haddock & Macey, 
Coasian Model, supra note [ ], at 1451 (“While the SEC’s present rules banning insider trading may well 
be supportable under certain theoretical conditions, the SEC’s refusal to permit firms to opt out of its rules 
suggests to us that the ban is motivated by political rent seeking rather than a quest for economic 
efficiency”).  See generally Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note [ ], at 81 (noting that in 
several countries, securities “law appears to be responding to changes in the market [i.e., the emergence of 
influential investor constituencies], not consciously leading it”).  See also Beny, The Political Economy of 
Insider Trading Legislation and Enforcement:  International Evidence, John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business Working Paper 348, Harvard Law School. 
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Figure 1: Average Ownership Concentration Plotted Against IT Law 
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 Figure 2: Average Stock Price Synchronicity Plotted Against IT Law 
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 Figure 3: Average Stock Market Turnover (1991-1995) Plotted Against IT Law 
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 Table 1: Description of the Variables 
 
 Description  
 Dependent Variables
Ownership 
Dispersion 
One minus the average fraction of common stock of the ten largest non-financial domestic firms owned by 
the three largest shareholders in the country.  La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ].   
 
Average Stock 
Market 
Turnover 
The total value traded divided by stock market capitalization, averaged across 1991-1995.  Emerging Markets 
Factbook, supra note [ ]. 
 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
The fraction (%) of stocks whose prices moved in the same direction in an average week in 1995.  Morck et 
al., supra note [ ]. 
 Insider Trading Law Variables
Tipping Tipping equals one if corporate insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders (tippees) about material non-
public information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; equals zero 
otherwise.  Gaillard, ed., supra note [ ]; and Stamp et al., eds., supra note [ ].   
 
Tippee Tippee equals one if tippees, like corporate insiders, are prohibited from trading on material non-public 
information that they have received from corporate insiders; equals zero otherwise.  Id.   
 
Damages Damages equals one if potential monetary penalties for violating insider trading laws are proportional to 
insiders’ trading profits; equals zero otherwise.  Id.   
 
Criminal Criminal equals one if violation of insider trading laws is a potential criminal offense; equals zero otherwise.  
Id.  
 
Scope Scope is a sub-index of insider trading law.  Scope measures the breadth of the insider trading prohibition.  It 
is the sum of Tipping and Tippee.  Scope ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 representing the most permissive insider 
trading prohibition and 2 representing the most restrictive insider trading prohibition. 
 
Sanction Sanction is a sub-index of insider trading law.  Sanction is a proxy for the expected criminal and monetary 
sanctions for violating a country’s insider trading laws.  It is the sum of Damages and Criminal.  Sanction 
ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 representing the lowest expected sanctions and 2 representing the highest expected 
sanctions. 
IT Law  The aggregate IT Law index equals the sum of (1) Tipping; (2) Tippee; (3) Damages; and (4) Criminal; or, 
equivalently, the sum of Scope and Sanction.  IT Law ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 representing the most lax 
insider trading legal regime and 4 representing the most restrictive insider trading legal regime.       
 Enforcement Variables
Enforced by 
1994 
A proxy for actual enforcement, Enforced by 1994 is an indicator variable that equals one if the country’s 
insider trading law has been enforced for the first time by the end of 1994.  Bhattacharya et al., World Price, 
supra note [ ]. 
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 Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
 
The public enforcement index is the arithmetic mean of an index of the securities market supervisor’s 
characteristics and an index of the securities market supervisor’s investigative powers. 
The securities market supervisor’s characteristics index equals the arithmetic mean of the four components: 
(1) Appointment – “[e]quals one if a majority of the members of the Supervisor are unilaterally appointed by 
the Executive branch of government; equals zero otherwise”; (2) Tenure – “[e]quals one if members of the 
Supervisor cannot be dismissed at the will of the appointing authority; equals zero otherwise; (3) Focus – 
“[e]quals one if separate government agencies or official authorities are in charge of supervising commercial 
banks and stock exchanges; equals zero otherwise; (4) Rules – “[e]quals one if the Supervisor can generally 
issue regulations regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges without prior approval 
of other governmental authorities.  Equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally issue regulations 
regarding primary offerings and/or listing rules on stock exchanges only with the prior approval of other 
governmental authorities.  Equals zero otherwise.”  La Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra note [ ]. 
The supervisor’s investigative powers index equals the arithmetic mean of two factors: (1) Document – “[a]n 
index of the power of the Supervisor to command documents when investigating a violation of securities 
laws.  Equals one if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order commanding all persons to 
turn over documents; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally issue an administrative order 
commanding publicly-traded corporations and/or their directors to turn over documents; equals zero 
otherwise; (2) Witness – “[a]n index of the power of the Supervisor to subpoena the testimony of witnesses 
when investigating a violation of securities laws.  Equals one if the Supervisor can generally subpoena all 
persons to give testimony; equals one-half if the Supervisor can generally subpoena the directors of publicly-
traded corporations to give testimony; equals zero otherwise.”  Id. 
 
Private Right Private right equals one if private parties have a private right of action against parties who have violated the 
country’s insider trading laws.  Gaillard, ed., supra note [ ]; and Stamp et al., eds., supra note [ ].   
Efficiency of the 
Judiciary 
Efficiency of the judiciary is a measure of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects 
business, particularly foreign firms.”  It is recorded as the arithmetic average between 1980 and 1983.  La 
Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra note [ ]. 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
The product of Private Right and Efficiency of the Judiciary. 
 Control Variables
Log of GDP Logarithm of per capita gross domestic product in 1995, measured in constant 1995 US $.  World Bank, 
World Development Report CD-Rom (2003). 
GDP Growth Average annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP for the years 1970-1993.  World Bank, World 
Development Report (1995). 
Anti-director 
Rights 
 
Aggregate index of shareholder rights.  The index is the sum of “(1) vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or 
deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority [rights]; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital.  La 
Porta et al., Self-Dealing, supra note [ ]. 
Legal Origin An indicator variable that signifies the legal origin of the country’s Company Law or Commercial Code.  
Legal origin may be English common law, French civil law, German civil law or Scandinavian civil law.  La 
Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]. 
Disclosure  The Disclosure index equals the arithmetic average of 6 separate indices of information that firms are legally 
required to include in their prospectuses: (1) Compensation; (2) Shareholders; (3) Inside Ownership; (4) 
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 Irregular contracts; (5) Transactions.  La Porta et al., Securities Laws, supra note [ ]  
 (1) Compensation is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of 
directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each 
director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the 
aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed 
firm; equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in 
the prospectus for a newly-listed firm.”  Id. 
(2) Shareholders is “[a]n index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s equity ownership structure.  
Equals one if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder 
who, directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer’s voting securities; equals one-half if 
reporting requirements for the Issuer’s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their 
aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing the name 
and ownership stake of the Issuer’s 10% shareholders.  No distinction is drawn between large-shareholder 
reporting requirements imposed on firms and those imposed on large shareholders themselves.”  Id. 
(3) Inside Ownership is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of 
the Issuer’s shares by its directors and key officers.  Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the 
ownership of the Issuer’s shares by each of its directors and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus; 
equals one-half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer’s shares by its directors and 
key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.”  Id. 
(4) Irregular contracts is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s contracts 
outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of 
material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the 
prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of 
business must be disclosed; equals zero otherwise.”  Id. 
(5) Transactions is “[a]n index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the 
Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”).  Equals one if the law or 
the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be 
disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties 
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need 
not be disclosed in the prospectus.”  Id. 
Accounting The accounting index is a measure of the quality of accounting standards.  The accounting index assigns a 
rating to companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or exclusion of 90 items.  The 90 
items are divided into 7 categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items).  For each country, the index is based on 
examination of a minimum of 3 companies.  The companies represent a cross-section of various industries.  
Seventy percent are industrial companies, while the remaining thirty percent are financial companies.  La 
Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ].  
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 Table 2:  Insider Trading Law and Enforceability 
This table presents the  insider trading law and enforcement measures for the sample 
countries, grouped by their legal origins: English common law versus European civil law.  
The columns contain the following variables: (1) Scope equals the sum of Tipping and 
Tippee; (2) Sanction equals the sum of Damages and Criminal; (3) the aggregate IT Law 
index is the sum of Scope and Sanction; (4) Enforced by 1994 equals one if the insider 
trading prohibition was enforced by 1994, and zero otherwise; (5) Public Enforcement 
Power is the mean of the indices of the securities market supervisor’s characteristics and 
investigative powers; and (6) Private Enforcement Power is the product of Private Right 
and the efficiency of the judiciary.  All variables are described in detail in Table 1. The 
superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  N/A signifies that the relevant information is not available for the country 
in question. 
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 Table 2 – Continued 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 
(1) 
Sanction 
 
 
 
(2) 
IT Law  
 
 
 
(3) 
Enforced 
by 1994 
 
 
(4) 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(5) 
Private  
Enforcement 
Power 
 
(6) 
Common Law Countries       
Australia 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.88 10.00 
Canada 2.00 2.00 4.00 1 0.81 9.25 
Hong Kong 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.75 0.00 
India 1.00 1.00 2.00 0 0.69 0.00 
Ireland 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.13 8.75 
Malaysia 1.00 1.00 2.00 0 0.69 9.00 
Singapore 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.75 10.00 
South Africa 1.00 1.00 2.00 0 0.38 6.00 
Thailand 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.88 0.00 
UK 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.63 0.00 
USA 2.00 2.00 4.00 1 1.00 10.00 
Common Law Average 1.73 1.18 2.91 0.54 0.69 5.73 
Civil Law Countries       
Austria 2.00 0.00 2.00 0 0.13 0.00 
Belgium 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.13 0.00 
Brazil 2.00 0.00 2.00 1 0.50 5.75 
Denmark 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.38 0.00 
Finland 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.38 0.00 
France 2.00 2.00 4.00 1 0.94 0.00 
Germany 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.25 0.00 
Greece 2.00 0.00 2.00 0 0.38 0.00 
Indonesia 1.00 1.00 2.00 0 0.75 0.00 
Italy 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.50 0.00 
Japan 1.00 1.00 2.00 1 0.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 N/A 0.00 
Mexico 1.00 0.00 1.00 0 0.25 0.00 
Netherlands 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.50 0.00 
Norway 1.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.13 0.00 
Philippines 1.00 1.00 2.00 0 0.88 0.00 
Portugal 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.88 5.50 
South Korea 2.00 2.00 4.00 1 0.38 6.00 
Spain 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.50 6.25 
Sweden 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.25 0.00 
Switzerland 2.00 1.00 3.00 0 0.25 0.00 
Taiwan 2.00 1.00 3.00 1 0.38 6.75 
Civil Law Average 1.77 0.86 2.64 0.45 0.41 1.44 
Overall Average 1.76 0.97 2.73 0.48 0.51 2.91 
 
 
t-test of difference in 
means (common law vs. 
civil law) 
-0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
1.67c 0.97 0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.86a 3.33a
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 Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the averages, medians and standard deviations of the three dependent 
variables (ownership dispersion, stock price synchronicity and average stock market 
turnover) and the control variables (log of GDP per capita, growth of GDP per capita, anti-
director rights, disclosure, and accounting standards).  All variables are described in detail in 
Table 1. The superscripts a, and b denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively.   
 
 
 Ave. Median Standard 
Deviation 
Common 
Law Ave. 
Civil Law 
Ave. 
t-test 
statistic 
Dependent 
Variables 
      
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 
57.00 
 
54.00 
 
13.90 
 
59.80 
 
55.50 
 
-0.82 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
 
66.25 
 
66.60 
 
4.34 
 
65.76 
 
66.52 
 
0.46 
Average Stock 
Market Turnover  
 
58.90 
 
44.85 
 
46.22 
 
44.54 
 
63.49 
 
1.12 
Control Variables       
Log of GDP per 
capita 
 
9.31 
 
9.89 
 
1.32 
 
9.13 
 
9.63 
 
1.12 
Growth of GDP 3.94 3.06 2.54 4.67 3.56 -1.18 
Anti-director rights 3.50 3.50 1.12 4.45 3.11 -4.24a
Disclosure 0.66 0.67 0.21 0.88 0.55 -5.91a
Accounting 65.80 65.00 9.47 71.20 63.10 -2.38b
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for the dependent variables, the substantive 
insider trading law measures and the enforcement measures.  All variables are described in detail 
in Table 1.  The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels (p-values) at which the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.  The superscripts a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4 – Continued 
 (1) 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 
(2) 
Stock Price  
Synchronicty 
(3) 
Average 
Stock 
Market 
Turnover 
(4) 
Scope 
(5) 
Sanction  
(6) 
IT Law 
(7) 
Enforced by 
1994 
(8) 
Public 
Enforc’t 
Power 
(9) 
Private 
Enforc’t 
Power 
Dependent Variables 
 
         
(1) Ownership Dispersion 
 
1.00         
(2) Stock Price Synchronicity -0.19 
(0.31) 
 
1.00        
(3) Average stock market 
turnover 
0.39b 
(0.03) 
-0.15 
(0.42) 
1.00       
 
Insider Trading Law Measures 
 
         
(4) Scope 0.13 
(0.47) 
 
-0.39b 
(0.03) 
0.37b 
(0.03) 
1.00      
(5) Sanction 0.53a 
(0.00) 
 
-0.37b 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.38) 
0.32c
(0.06) 
1.00     
(6) IT Law 0.41b 
(0.02) 
-0.36b 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.69a 
(0.00) 
0.79a 
(0.00) 
1.00    
Enforcement Measures 
 
         
(7) Enforced by 1994 0.52a 
(0.00) 
 
-0.11 
(0.55) 
0.19  
(0.28) 
0.29c
(0.09) 
0.35b 
(0.04) 
0.33b 
(0.05) 
1.00   
(8) Public Enforcement Power 0.01 
(0.96) 
 
-0.28 
(0.13) 
-0.09 
(0.60) 
0.08 
(0.66) 
0.47a 
(0.00) 
0.41b 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
1.00  
(9) Private Enforcement Power 0.19 
(0.28) 
 
-0.05 
(0.78) 
-0.01 
(0.96) 
0.15 0.34c 0.70a 0.02 
(0.40) (0.06) (0.00) (0.92) 
0.33c 
(0.07) 
1.00 
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Table 5: Ownership Dispersion 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variable ownership 
dispersion.  The variables Scope and Sanction are centered about their means to address 
multicollinearity.  The variable Scope*Sanction is the product of mean-centered Scope and 
mean-centered Sanction.  Table 1 describes all of the variables in detail.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent 
and Control  
Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Scope   -0.06 
  (0.08)    
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.10c 
(0.07) 
Sanction 0.15a 
(0.05) 
0.15a 
(0.05) 
0.16b 
(0.06) 
Scope* 
Sanction 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
Disclosure -0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.23 
(0.20) 
-0.26 
(0.24) 
Anti-
Director 
Rights 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
French Civil 
Law  
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
German 
Civil Law 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
Scandina-
vian Civil 
Law 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
Log of GDP 
per Capita 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Growth of 
GDP  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Enforced by 
1994  
 0.09b 
(0.04) 
0.09b 
(0.04) 
 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
  0.02 
(0.12) 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
  -0.00 
(0.01) 
Constant  0.39 
(0.39) 
0.61b 
(0.32) 
0.58 
(0.38) 
No. of Obs. 31 31 31 
R2 0.58 0.65 0.67 
 
 
 71
71
Beny:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
 Table 6: Stock Price Synchronicity 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variable stock price 
synchronicity.  The variables Scope and Sanction are centered about their means to address 
multicollinearity.  The variable Scope*Sanction is the product of mean-centered Scope and 
mean-centered Sanction.  Table 1 describes all of the variables in detail.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent 
and Control  
Variables  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Scope   0.27 
  (2.58)    
0.58 
(2.47) 
2.49 
(2.39) 
Sanction -5.39a 
(1.54) 
-5.44a 
(1.52) 
-5.28a 
(1.37) 
Scope* 
Sanction 
-4.55 
(3.30) 
-4.30 
(3.20) 
-5.48c
(3.02) 
Disclosure 16.53a 
(5.84) 
17.56a 
(6.25) 
24.14a 
(5.51) 
Anti-
Director 
Rights 
0.04 
(0.90) 
0.11 
(0.85) 
0.23 
(0.64) 
French Civil 
Law  
5.30b 
(2.13) 
5.66b 
(2.14) 
7.61a 
(1.93) 
German 
Civil Law 
5.16 
(3.15) 
5.47c 
(3.20) 
5.52b 
(2.39) 
Scandina-
vian Civil 
Law 
6.29b  
(2.61) 
6.72b 
(2.92) 
8.09a 
(2.57) 
Log of GDP 
per Capita 
-0.52 
(0.72) 
-0.41 
(0.77) 
-1.35c 
(0.76) 
Growth of 
GDP  
0.78b 
(0.33) 
0.81b 
(0.34) 
0.75b 
(0.29) 
Enforced by 
1994  
 -0.78 
(1.56) 
-0.44 
(1.58) 
 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
  -7.30a 
(1.90) 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
  0.25 
(0.18) 
Constant  53.82a 
(8.27) 
51.93a 
(9.42) 
59.85a 
(9.14) 
No. of Obs. 30 30 30 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.74 
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Table 7: Stock Market Turnover 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variable log of average 
stock market turnover between 1991 and 1995.  The variables Scope and Sanction are centered 
about their means to address multicollinearity.  The variable Scope*Sanction is the product of 
mean-centered Scope and mean-centered Sanction.  Table 1 describes all of the variables in 
detail.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Independent 
and Control  
Variables  
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Scope   0.87*
  (0.40)    
0.84c
(0.42) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
Sanction 0.01 
(0.25) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
Scope* 
Sanction 
1.26a 
(0.48) 
1.24b 
(0.49) 
1.33a 
(0.48) 
Disclosure 0.09 
(0.94) 
-0.02 
(1.04) 
-0.77 
(1.03) 
Anti-
Director 
Rights 
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
French Civil 
Law  
0.10 
(0.39) 
0.06 
(0.40) 
-0.12 
(0.41) 
German 
Civil Law 
0.94c 
(0.47) 
0.92c 
(0.50) 
1.03c 
(0.59) 
Scandina-
vian Civil 
Law 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.09 
(0.41) 
0.04 
(0.52) 
Log of GDP 
per Capita 
0.00 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
Growth of 
GDP  
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Enforced by 
1994  
 0.10 
(0.25) 
 
0.08 
(0.23) 
 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
  1.04 
(0.93) 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
  -0.02 
(0.03) 
Constant  3.35b 
(1.62) 
3.57b 
(1.84) 
2.43 
(2.16) 
No. of Obs. 31 31 31 
R2 0.60 0.60 0.66 
 
 
                                                 
*  Significant at the 11% level only. 
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Table 8: Interaction of Sanctions and Public Enforcement 
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions for the dependent variables: ownership dispersion, stock price 
synchronicity, and the log of average stock market turnover.  The regressions in columns 2, 4 and 6 contain the same 
independent variables as Model 3 presented in Tables 5 – 7, plus Public Enforcement Power*Sanction.  In columns 2, 4 and 6, 
the insider trading law variables and Public Enforcement Power are centered around their means to address multicollinearity.  
All variables are described in detail in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Independent 
and Control 
Variables 
 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 
(1) 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 
(2) 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
 
(3) 
Stock Price 
Synchronicity 
 
(4) 
Log of Average 
Stock Market 
Turnover 
(5) 
 
Log of Average 
Stock Market 
Turnover 
(6) 
Scope  -0.03 
(0.07) 
 -0.12  
  (0.07)     
1.02 
(2.06) 
2.02 
(2.54) 
0.45 
(0.36) 
0.69±
(0.44) 
Sanction  0.15b 
(0.06) 
 -5.35a
(1.38) 
 -0.05 
(0.29) 
Scope*Sanction  0.12 
(0.13) 
 -4.43 
(3.37) 
 1.09¥
(0.64) 
Disclosure 0.07 
(0.20) 
-0.35 
(0.29) 
14.35a
(4.90) 
22.74a 
(5.69) 
-0.27 
(0.70) 
-0.43 
(1.41) 
Anti-Director 
Rights 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.68) 
-0.36 
(0.71) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
French Civil 
Law  
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
3.78b
1.83 
6.98a 
(2.11) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.03 
(0.56) 
German Civil 
Law 
0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
2.20 
(2.18) 
5.17b 
(2.41) 
0.95b
(0.43) 
1.12c 
(0.62) 
Scandinavian 
Civil Law 
0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
3.32 
2.26 
7.47a 
(2.49) 
0.39 
(0.38) 
0.19 
(0.64) 
Log of GDP per 
Capita 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-1.20b
(0.52) 
-1.23 
(0.80) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
Growth of GDP  -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.28) 
0.70b 
(0.31) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
Enforced by 
1994  
 0.10b 
(0.04) 
 -0.30 
(1.61) 
 
 0.04 
(0.24) 
 
Public  0.09  -6.22b  0.79 
                                                 
±  Significant at the 13% level only. 
¥  Significant at the 11% level only. 
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Enforcement 
Power 
(0.16) (2.54) (1.05) 
Private 
Enforcement 
Power 
 -0.00 
(0.01) 
 0.25 
(0.18) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
Sanction * 
Public 
Enforcement 
Power 
0.11b
(0.05) 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
-6.66a
(1.06) 
-2.74 
(3.66) 
0.52c
(0.26) 
0.64 
(0.97) 
Constant  0.09 
(0.34) 
0.61 
(0.40) 
66.07a
(6.65) 
60.23a 
(9.37) 
1.42 
(1.27) 
2.33 
(2.25) 
No. of Obs. 31 31 30 30 31 31 
R2 0.49 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.57 0.67 
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